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From Sex for Pleasure to Sex for Parenthood: How 
the Law Manufactures Mothers 
Beth A. Burkstrand-Reid* 
As soon as sperm enter a woman, so do law and politics—or so the decades-long disputes 
surrounding abortion suggest. Now, however, renewed debates regarding contraceptives 
indicate that legal and political interference with women’s sexual and reproductive 
autonomy may actually precede the sperm. This Article argues that women even thinking 
about having sex are increasingly defined socially and legally as “mothers.” Via this broad 
definition of who is a “mother,” the State extends its reach into women’s decisionmaking 
throughout their reproductive lifetimes. 
 
This Article argues that the State simultaneously devalues women’s choices to have sex for 
pleasure, which this Article calls “desexualization,” and uses medical rituals associated 
with motherhood, which this Article calls “ritualization,” to persuade women to accept the 
role of mother. Desexualization and ritualization signal the State’s attempt to influence 
women’s sexual and reproductive decisionmaking not only in the context of abortion, but 
also in the areas of contraception, pregnancy, and childbirth. 
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College of Law; B.A., Emory University. Thank you to Jamie R. Abrams, Eric Berger, Eve M. Brank, 
Caroline Mala Corbin, Stephanie Davidson, Jason Eiker-Wiles, Jennifer S. Hendricks, Lisa C. Ikemoto, Craig 
M. Lawson, Jody Lyneé Madeira, Richard Moberly, Brian Reid, Sandra B. Zellmer, and Mary Ziegler for their 
comments on this project and to April I. Kirkendall, April L. Marty, Abby R. McConnaughhay, and Noëlle 
Anneliese Polk for their research assistance. 
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Introduction 
“‘[B]eing against sex is not good. . . . Sex is popular.’”
1
 
Sex is complicated. It can be physical, emotional, violent, tender, for 
pleasure or for procreation, and any combination of these.
2
 Arguably, no other 
act can have so many different meanings and consequences, pregnancy 
included. But two things are certain: sex is popular, and women, specifically, 
are sexual beings.
3
 Perhaps due to its near-universal appeal, sex is also a 
frequent subject of legal regulation.
4
 Today, women are regulated—not as 
sexual beings but as would-be mothers—long before they ever have sex and 
certainly before they see a fetal image on an ultrasound screen, whether before 
an abortion or as a milestone on a path to childbirth.
5
 
For women, “[s]ex for pleasure, for fun, or even for building relationships 
is completely absent from our national conversation.”
6
 Instead, the national 
focus is on “morality,” a one-word descriptor for the anxiety that female 
 
 1. Maureen Dowd, Ghastly Outdated Party, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/02/26/opinion/sunday/dowd-ghastly-outdated-party.html (quoting Republican strategist Alex Castellanos). 
Sex may be procreative or not or to achieve intimacy or not. See generally Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. 
Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, 59 Emory L.J. 809 (2010). “Sex” in this Article refers to consensual, 
potentially procreative intercourse. See Krisztina Morvai, What is Missing from the Rhetoric of Choice? A 
Feminist Analysis of the Abortion Dilemma in the Context of Sexuality, 5 UCLA Women’s L.J. 445, 460 (1995). 
“Pleasure,” as used in this Article, is a positive “feeling, a sensation, a subjectively experienced phenomenon” 
stemming from sex. See Paul R. Abramson & Steven D. Pinkerton, With Pleasure: Thoughts on the Nature of 
Human Sexuality 45 (1995). 
 2. Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 187, 225; see 
Margo Kaplan, Sex-Positive Law, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming Apr. 2014) (arguing that “sexual pleasure 
has value because of the pleasure it provides and apart from its ability to serve other ends such as emotional 
bonding or procreation”). Sex for pleasure and sex for procreation are not necessarily disaggregated, though in 
this Article the intent of sex for pleasure is pleasure itself, not procreation. 
 3. See Debby Herbenick et al., Sexual Behavior in the United States: Results from a National 
Probability Sample of Men and Women Ages 14–94, 7 J. Sexual Med. 255, 262 (2010) (detailing women’s 
varied sexual activities). Anti-abortion-rights advocates may be portrayed as being “anti-sex.” See Kristin 
Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood 210 (1984) (noting that people who are anti-abortion rights 
“value sex, of course, but they value it for its traditional benefits (babies)” rather than for intimacy). 
 4. Andrea Dworkin, Intercourse 185 (1987). For examples of social and legal regulation, see Elizabeth 
Bernstein & Laurie Schaffner, Regulating Sex: The Politics of Intimacy and Identity (2005); John D’Emilio & 
Estelle B. Freedman, Intimate Matters: A History of Sexuality in America (2012). 
 5. See infra Part III; see also Beth Burkstrand-Reid, The War on Sex for Pleasure, Huffington Post 
(May 16, 2012, 1:58 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/beth-burkstrandreid/war-on-
women_b_1521804.html (arguing that the “war on sex” targets both women and sex itself). 
 6. Jessica Valenti, The Purity Myth: How America’s Obsession with Virginity is Hurting Young 
Women 43 (2009) [hereinafter Valenti, Purity Myth]. Strikingly, sex and sexuality are often not associated 
with motherhood. Beth Montemurro & Jenna Marie Siefken, MILFS and Matrons: Images and Realities of 
Mothers’ Sexuality, 16 Sexuality & Culture 366, 367 (2012); Rebecca W. Tardy, “But I Am a Good Mom”: 
The Social Construction of Motherhood Through Health-Care Conversations, 29 J. Contemp. Ethnography 
433, 462–63 (2000). Women’s sexuality is culturally constructed and influenced by male dominance. 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law 53 (1987). 
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sexuality provokes in the collective consciousness.
7
 Increasingly, the State is 
the moral arbitrator of women’s sexual choices. 
While the dialogue on sexual activity has long focused on abortion,
8
 more 
recent controversies have involved non-abortion reproductive health issues, 
such as contraception.
9
 These debates boil down to one question about every 
woman: when she has sex, is she acting as a “slut,” by having sex for pleasure, 
or as a “mother,” by having sex for procreation?
10
 The answer to this question 
has profound legal consequences for contraception policy, abortion rights, and 
even medical care during pregnancy.
11
 This Article argues that for women 
today, there is no such thing as sex for pleasure under the law: only sex for the 
purpose of becoming a mother is considered legitimate, and women’s sexual 
and reproductive health choices are regulated accordingly.
12
 
So if you are a woman, are you a “slut” or a “mother”? Given that nearly 
all women use contraception during their lifetime, there are a lot of “sluts”—
women having sex without intending to procreate—out there.
13
 This Article 
argues that the law regulates women’s reproductive choices by re-
conceptualizing all sexually active (or potentially sexually active) women as 
 
 7. Carol Groneman, Nymphomania: A History xvii (2000); Marty Klein, America’s War on Sex: The 
Attack on Law, Lust and Liberty 2 (2006); Edward L. Rubin, Sex, Politics, and Morality, 47 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 1, 2 (2005). 
 8. State Policy Trends: Abortion and Contraception in the Crosshairs, Guttmacher Inst. (Apr. 13, 
2012), http://www.guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2012/04/13/index.html (“In the first three months of 2012, 
legislators in 45 of the 46 legislatures that have convened this year introduced 944 provisions related to 
reproductive health and rights. Half of these provisions would restrict abortion access.”). 
 9. Richard Wolf & Cathy Lynn Grossman, Obama Mandate on Birth Control Coverage Stirs 
Controversy, USA Today (Feb. 9, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2012-02-
08/catholics-contraceptive-mandate/53014864/1. 
 10. “Slut” is used in this Article because of its use in the Sandra Fluke controversy. See Julie Rovner, Law 
Student Makes Case for Contraceptive Coverage, Nat’l Pub. Radio (Feb. 23 2012, 4:39 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2012/02/23/147299323/law-student-makes-case-for-contraceptive-coverage. 
“Slut” is defined by Merriam-Webster Dictionary as “a promiscuous woman; especially: PROSTITUTE.” Slut 
Definition, Merriam-Webster.com, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/slut (last visited Oct. 6, 2013); 
see Leora Tanenbaum, Slut!: Growing Up Female with a Bad Reputation 11 (1999) (arguing that “slut-bashing” is 
about more than sex—it reflects a girl’s failure to behave according to social dictates). This Article adopts the 
Oxford Dictionary’s definition that motherhood occurs after birth. Mother Definition, OxfordDictionaries.com, 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/mother (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) (“[A] woman in 
relation to a child or children to whom she has given birth.”). This Article also acknowledges both the physical and 
social burdens of motherhood. Jennifer S. Hendricks, Body and Soul: Equality, Pregnancy, and the Unitary Right 
to Abortion, 45 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 329, 340–41 (2010). 
 11. See infra Parts II, III. 
 12. Robert D. Goldstein, Mother-Love and Abortion: A Legal Interpretation 13–16 (1988). This is not to 
say that puritanical notions of sexuality are new. See generally Gail Collins, America’s Women: Four 
HundredYears of Dolls, Drudges, Helpmates, and Heroines (2003) (discussing the history of women, including 
women and sex). 
 13. Ninety-nine percent of women fifteen to forty-four years of age who have had intercourse have used 
contraception. William D. Mosher & Jo Jones, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Use of Contraception 
in the United States: 1982–2008, at 5 (Aug. 2010). 
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mothers.
14
 Motherhood is not just a biological status; it is a socially 
constructed role with built-in behavioral expectations—including some 
surrounding sexuality—that are imposed on women.
15
 
In the context of abortion care, the State’s use of the law to regulate 
women’s reproductive choices is clear—focusing solely on abortion is a 
reductionist view of women, their health, and the State’s role in women’s 
lives.
16
 By broadly defining “mother” to include all women of reproductive 
age, the State is able to extend its reach over women’s reproductive lives and 
autonomous decisionmaking.
17
 Moreover, when a woman is pregnant, the State 
can assert its authority to prohibit abortion or use its power to regulate the 
choices of the “mother” in order to protect the fetus.
18
 These are but examples; 
the State regulates a woman’s entire reproductive lifetime, not simply specific 
points within it. This blinds us to opportunities to improve women’s health 
holistically and reduces women’s autonomy. 
This Article argues that the law effectively re-characterizes women as 
mothers by (1) desexualizing women, or advancing the notion that women 
should only have sex for procreation,
19
 and (2) ritualizing women’s healthcare 
by viewing and treating women (pregnant or not) as “pre-mothers,” and using 
the law to impose medical and social practices associated with “good mothers” 
upon them.
20
 The law embodies both desexualization and ritualization in many 
aspects of the regulation of women’s sexuality. The presence of 
desexualization and ritualization in law and policy serves as a warning that the 
State is reaching into women’s health-related decisionmaking. This Article 
further argues that desexualization and ritualization can be mobilized as legal 
 
 14. Cynthia R. Daniels, At Women’s Expense: State Power and the Politics of Fetal Rights 26 (1993) 
(“In this legal and political discourse, women’s autonomy is traded against (and often traded away) by 
women’s right to reproductive choice.”). In the case of women who are already parenting, they are re-
characterized as “mothers” of additional children-to-be, regardless of whether future pregnancy or parenting is 
desired. These women can still be “sluts” if they have sex for pleasure instead of sex for further procreation. 
 15. Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Beyond “A Woman’s Right to Choose”: Feminist Ideas About Reproductive 
Rights, in The Reproductive Rights Reader: Law, Medicine, and the Construction of Motherhood 107 (Nancy 
Ehrenreich ed., 2008) (“[W]oman’s reproductive situation is never the result of biology alone, but of biology mediated 
by social and cultural organization.”); see Elisabeth Badinter, The Conflict: How Modern Motherhood Undermines 
the Status of Women 12–14 (2010); Jessica Valenti, Why Have Kids?: A New Mom Explores the Truth About 
Parenting and Happiness 4 (2012) [hereinafter Why Have Kids?]; Jessica Valenti, He’s a Stud, She’s A Slut And 49 
Other Double Standards Every Woman Should Know 118–21 (2008); M. M. Slaughter, The Legal Construction of 
“Mother”, in Mothers in Law: Feminist Theory and the Legal Regulation of Motherhood 73 (Martha Albertson 
Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995). There are many types of mothers, mothering, and motherhood. See Carol 
Sanger, M is for the Many Things, 1 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women’s Stud. 15, 31–32 (1992). 
 16. Lynn M. Paltrow, Abortion Issue Divides, Distracts Us from Common Threats and Threads, A.B.A: 
Persps., Winter 2005. 
 17. See infra Part II. 
 18. See infra Parts II, III. 
 19. For many, this means having sex within marriage, even if that is not the case in practice. Richard A. 
Posner, Sex and Reason 243 (1992). 
 20. Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Making Mommies: Law, Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis, and the 
Complications of Pre-Motherhood, 18 Colum. J. Gender & L. 313, 337 (2008). 
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tools used to transform women into “mothers,” thus making their 
decisionmaking and their bodies fair game for regulation. 
Part I of this Article examines the legal transformation of women into 
mothers by analyzing the conversion of “women’s health” to “maternal health” 
in abortion jurisprudence. Subpart A briefly examines the conceptualization of 
health generally, women’s health, and maternal health. It further details 
problems posed by the use of “maternal health” in the law as a descriptor for 
health issues faced by pregnant women. Subpart B argues that abortion 
jurisprudence is the exemplar for how the law co-opts women’s health and thus 
transforms even non-pregnant women into mothers. 
Part II argues that in both the abortion context and beyond, sexual and 
reproductive health laws desexualize women, re-characterizing women’s desire 
to have sex for pleasure as an act of procreation instead, thus facilitating 
regulation of women’s health far beyond abortion. Subpart A defines 
desexualization as advancing the notion that women should only have sex for 
procreation, and examines its development in the law. Subpart B argues that 
desexualization begins before sex, through stigmatization of sexually active 
women, as the debate around the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”)—otherwise 
known as Obamacare—exemplifies. Subpart C uses the emergency 
contraception controversy to illustrate that once a woman has sex, she is 
assumed to have consented to the role of “mother,” thus allowing the woman 
to be legally treated as a mother and her health treated as “maternal health.” 
Part III discusses the impact of ritualization in reproductive health law. 
Specifically, Part III focuses on how ritualization, in combination with 
desexualization, is mobilized in an attempt to control women’s reproductive 
decisionmaking. Subpart A defines ritualization as the use of medical 
experiences related to pregnancy and childbirth to influence the sexual and 
reproductive decisionmaking of women. Abortion laws mimic the rituals of 
obstetrical care, for example, as a way of pushing women toward motherhood. 
Subpart B examines how this ritualization occurs outside of the abortion 
context, specifically during a continuing pregnancy, an area subject to 
extensive—but under-examined—legal regulation. 
Finally, Part IV theorizes that future laws will employ ritualization and 
desexualization to reduce women’s reproductive autonomy.
21
 Subpart A 
discusses the current use of desexualization and ritualization in current 
controversies in contraception regulation and abortion legislation. Subpart B 
 
 21. See generally Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the Ideology of 
Motherhood, the Practice of Defaulting to Science, and the Interventionist Mindset of Law, 53 Ohio St. L.J. 
1205, 1207 (1992) [hereinafter Ikemoto, Code of Perfect Pregnancy] (“However, there is outstanding the idea 
and practice of controlling women with regard to conception, gestation, and childbirth in ways that express 
dominant cultural notions of motherhood.”); Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Reproductive Choices and Informed 
Consent: Fetal Interests, Women’s Identity, and Relational Autonomy, 37 Am. J.L. & Med. 567, 568–69 
(2011) (discussing how lawmakers and the public are “obsessed” with reproduction). This Article focuses on 
how potentially procreative sex is regulated. Procreative sex is but one form of sexual expression.  
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hypothesizes how future regulation of contraceptives may rest on 
desexualization and ritualization. 
At its core, this Article theorizes that the law re-conceptualizes sexually 
active women, pushing them toward the role of a lifetime: motherhood.
22
 After 
all, using contraceptives, for example, is “a license to do things in a sexual 
realm that is counter to how things are supposed to be.”
23
 When women resist 
the role of mother, they face marginalization and stigmatization—and, in some 
cases, legal control of their decisionmaking. 
I.  Women’s Health Is Dead. Long Live Maternal Health 
In 2006, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) 
recommended that all women of childbearing age take vitamins, abstain from 
certain behaviors such as smoking and heavy drinking, and monitor their 
weight, all to prepare for eventual motherhood.
24
 In essence, the government 
indicated that it viewed women as mothers-to-be.
25
 Women are transformed 
into mothers via government actions that are ostensibly designed to protect 
women’s health. We see this in regulatory contexts such as the CDC 
recommendations, as well as via various statutes and court decisions: the 
underlying questions are whose health is most important—the pregnant 
woman’s or the fetus’—and who gets to make that determination.
26
 
A. From Woman to Mother, Women’s Health to Maternal Health 
Abortion jurisprudence provides the quintessential example of the legal 
conceptualization of women as mothers.
27
 We see this directly in Supreme 
Court rhetoric, which emphasizes “maternal” health despite the fact that not all 
sexually active women are mothers and not all women want to be mothers.
28
 
 
 22. Turning women into “mothers” in the law via desexualization and ritualization may be intentional or 
an unintended result of broader social and legal policies. 
 23. Charles P. Pierce, Santorum’s War Against Women, Continued, Esquire (Jan. 3, 2012, 3:41 PM), 
http://www.esquire.com/blogs/politics/rick-santorum-contraception-6632083 (quoting Rick Santorum); see 
John Bancroft, Editorial: The Pill, Sex, and the Politics of Gender, Medical Aspects of Human Sexuality (Mar. 
2002) (“The idea that [the pill] might allow unmarried women to enjoy sex free of fears of pregnancy was 
anathema to many physicians, and concern that it might ‘let loose’ the sexuality of married women was not far 
below the surface.”) (on file with Author). 
 24. Why Have Kids?, supra note 15, at 3–4. 
 25. Id.; see Rebecca Kukla, Measuring Mothering, 1 Int’l J. Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 67, 69 
(2008); Jessica Valenti, Full Frontal Feminism 154–55 (2007). 
 26. Margo Kaplan, “A Special Class of Persons”: Pregnant Women’s Right to Refuse Medical Treatment 
After Gonzales v. Carhart, 13 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 145, 203 (2010). 
 27. Luker, supra note 3, at 193 (“[T]he abortion debate is so passionate and hard-fought because it is a 
referendum on the place and meaning of motherhood.”). 
 28. Elizabeth A. Reilly, The Rhetoric of Disrespect: Uncovering the Faulty Premises Infecting 
Reproductive Rights, 5 Am. U. J. Gender & L. 147, 157–58 (1996) (“[T]he United States Supreme Court has 
consistently viewed women through their reproductive capacity. Women have been subsumed into their 
reproductive organs. The woman as an independent person with interests and needs is invisible in the Court’s 
decisions: instead, law has treated women first and foremost as potential or actual mothers.”). 
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To understand the differences between health, women’s health, and 
maternal health, one may visualize a funnel. At the top of the funnel is the 
broadest category of “health,” a non-sex-specific term referring to “a state of 
complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of 
disease or infirmity.”
29
 Further into the narrowing funnel, we reach “women’s 
health,” which includes sex-specific health issues faced by women in their 
lifetime, including but not limited to concerns based on women’s unique 
sexual and reproductive capacity.
30
 Below women’s health is an even smaller 
subset of women’s health—some call it “maternal health”—which specifically 
relates to pregnancy, birth, and post-partum care.
31
 Only some women 
experience these health issues. Almost one in five women end their 
reproductive years without having a child, double the percentage in the 
1970s.
32
 
When used in a legal context, the descriptor “maternal health” is often 
coupled with use of the term “mother” to refer to pregnant women.
33
 When 
these terms are used together, the woman’s health is no longer her own, but is 
tied up with the demands of motherhood even prior to childbirth. Thus, judicial 
use of the term “maternal health” when discussing pregnancy and childbirth is 
particularly problematic. Women’s health is often reduced to maternal health, a 
transformation with significant implications.
34
 Motherhood, after all, is not just 
a physical condition; it is also a social role.
35
 In other words, legal protections 
of maternal health are not just a means to keeping women healthy; they propel 
women toward accepting a mothering role. This role requires a woman to 
 
 29. World Health Org. [WHO], WHO Definition of Health, http://www.who.int/about/ 
definition/en/print.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2013). Within its general “health” definition, the WHO includes the 
non-sex-specific concept of “reproductive health,” which concerns the functioning of “reproductive processes, 
functions and system at all stages of life. Reproductive health, therefore, implies that people are able to have a 
responsible, satisfying and safe sex life and that they have the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, 
when and how often to do so.” WHO, Health Topics: Reproductive Health, 
http://www.who.int/topics/reproductive_health/en (last visited Oct. 8, 2013). 
 30. See U.S. Nat’l Library of Med., Nat’l Insts. of Health, Women’s Health, 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/womenshealth.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2013) (“Women have unique 
health issues. And some of the health issues that affect both men and women can affect women differently. 
Unique issues include pregnancy, menopause, and conditions of the female organs. Women can have a healthy 
pregnancy by getting early and regular prenatal care. They should also get recommended breast cancer, 
cervical cancer, and bone density screenings. Women and men also have many of the same health problems. 
But these problems can affect women differently.”). 
 31. See, e.g., WHO, Health Topics: Maternal Health, http://www.who.int/topics/maternal_health/en (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2013). 
 32. Gretchen Livingston & D’Vera Cohn, Childlessness Up Among All Women; Down Among Women 
with Advanced Degrees, Pew Research Ctr. (June 25, 2010), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/ 1642/more-women-
without-children. 
 33. See infra Part I.B. 
 34. See Reilly, supra note 28, at 157–58, 164–65. Abortion jurisprudence frequently contains 
paternalistic concern for women’s mental health, suggesting, for example, that women who have an abortion 
will regret their decision. Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-
Making, 16 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 223, 290 (2009). 
 35. Petchesky, supra note 15, at 107. 
5. Burkstrand-Reid_28 (Do Not Delete) – DRAFT: DO NOT CITE 12/1/2013 11:33 AM 
December 2013]     SEX FOR PLEASURE 219 
subrogate her needs—sexual and otherwise—to the needs of her fetus or 
child.
36
 In reproductive health law, this means that the law focuses primarily 
on how the medical treatment of her body impacts her ability to fulfill her 
socially defined role as a mother.
37
 
Abortion jurisprudence often conceptualizes all women as mothers or 
potential mothers. Such laws push women toward “maternal” roles, even when 
women are clearly rejecting motherhood, and ignore the importance of sex for 
pleasure.
38
 Thus, abortion jurisprudence signals that to regulate women’s 
reproductive autonomy, the law conceptualizes them as mothers. The law does 
so often by invoking “maternal health” even when a woman attempts to avoid 
motherhood. This signals desexualization, the notion that women should only 
have sex for procreation, and ritualization, viewing and treating women 
(pregnant or not) as “pre-mothers” and using the law to impose medical and 
social practices associated with “good mothers” upon them.
39
 
B. Abortion and Motherhood Via Maternal Health 
In Roe v. Wade, the germinal case confirming the right to have an 
abortion in some circumstances, the Supreme Court established a tripartite 
framework to judge the constitutionality of abortion restrictions.
40
 In the 
standard itself, the Court vacillates between treating the pregnant woman as a 
woman or as a mother; its conceptualization of the woman seeking an abortion 
is dependent upon the point at which she seeks to end the pregnancy.
41
 The 
woman remains a person separate from the fetus until the end of the first 
trimester: “For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, 
the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment 
of the pregnant woman’s attending physician.”
42
 The woman is still seen, at 
this point, as a person experiencing a medical condition—pregnancy—not a 
woman occupying the socially defined role of mother.
43
  
However, at some point after the end of the first trimester, a “pregnant 
woman’s” health becomes “maternal health” in the rhetoric of the decision, 
suggesting that the woman is then a mother: “For the stage subsequent to 
 
 36. Badinter, supra note 15, at 12–14; Judith Warner, Perfect Madness: Motherhood in the Age of 
Anxiety 61–71 (2005); Mary Ziegler, The Bonds That Tie: The Politics of Motherhood and the Future of 
Abortion Rights, 21 Tex. J. Women & L. 47, 56–58 (2011). 
 37. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159–60 (2007); Nancy Ehrenreich, The Colonization of 
the Womb, 43 Duke L.J. 492, 496–97 (1993). 
 38.  State Policy Trends 2013: Abortion Bans Move to the Fore, Guttmacher Inst. (Apr. 11, 2013), 
http://www.guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2013/04/11/index.html. 
 39. See Mutcherson, supra note 20, at 337; infra Parts II, III. 
 40. 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973). 
 41. Id. Roe did not give women a positive right—the right existed naturally. Robin West, From Choice to 
Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118 Yale L.J. 1394, 1403 (2009). 
 42. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164 (emphasis added). 
 43. But see Lisa C. Ikemoto, Abortion, Contraception and the ACA: The Realignment of Women’s 
Health, 55 How. L.J. 731, 762–64 (2012) [hereinafter Ikemoto, The Realignment of Women’s Health] (arguing 
that abortion has been disconnected from women’s health). 
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approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest 
in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure 
in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.”
44
 That shift in 
language is illustrative.
45
 From this point in the pregnancy, the State’s interest 
is no longer conditioned solely on the pregnant woman’s body, but also on her 
role as a mother.
46
 
Many viewed Roe as empowering women because it ensured their ability 
to control their reproductive lives and to do so safely. But while Roe restricted 
the State’s ability to limit women’s access to abortion, it also empowered the 
State.
47
 The decision specifically approved of abortion regulations during 
certain points in pregnancy if those regulations were premised on protecting 
“maternal health.”
48
 The Court uses the descriptor “mother” for women who 
clearly rejected that role at that time—they chose to have an abortion.
49
 Roe 
signaled a deeper social and legal shift toward conceptualizing all sexually 
active women as mothers, a move that is now evident even outside of the 
abortion context.
50
 As we will see, many of the most expansive actions of 
courts and legislatures today rely on Roe and its progeny, either for its health-
related language, for its language on the State’s interest in the fetus, or for the 
general assertion that the State may regulate women’s bodies. 
Some abortion cases subsequent to Roe chipped away at the right to 
access abortion.
51
 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, for example, gave wide berth 
to government regulation of the procedure.
52
 But issues related to the health of 
pregnant women and their rejection of their socially defined role as mothers 
 
 44. Roe, 410 U.S at 164 (emphasis added). The Court’s use of the “mother” descriptor continues through 
the “stage subsequent to viability” when it says the State “may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, 
abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health 
of the mother.” Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65. 
 45. Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 10, 13–14 (1987); Julie Novkov, 
A Deconstruction of (M)otherhood and a Reconstruction of Parenthood, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 
155, 159–60 (1992). 
 46. See Adrienne Rich, Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution 42 (1995); Ikemoto, 
Code of Perfect Pregnancy, supra note 21, at 1285 (stating that reproduction-related regulations “devalue 
women as persons by characterizing women as wombs”). 
 47. See generally Cristina Page, How the Pro-Choice Movement Saved America: Freedom, Politics, and 
the War on Sex (2006) (discussing the continuing erosion of reproductive rights). 
 48. Roe vests the decision to have an abortion—and how to have that abortion—not with the woman, but 
largely with her doctor. 410 U.S. at 164–65. 
 49. Id. at 120. 
 50. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, How New Genetic Technologies Will Transform Roe v. Wade, 56 Emory 
L.J. 843, 844 (2007); Reilly, supra note 28, at 159–160; see also infra Parts II, III. 
 51. For a discussion of the health impact of major abortion rulings, see generally Beth A. Burkstrand-
Reid, The Invisible Woman: Availability and Culpability in Reproductive Health Jurisprudence, 81 U. Colo. L. 
Rev. 97 (2010) [hereinafter Burkstrand-Reid, The Invisible Woman]. For an overview of major abortion 
decisions, see David Masci & Ira C. Lupu, A History of Key Abortion Rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court, Pew 
Research Ctr.: Religion & Pub. Life Project (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.pewforum.org/Abortion/A-History-of-
Key-Abortion-Rulings-of-the-US-Supreme-Court.aspx. 
 52. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873–74 (1992). Casey also uses “mother” as 
a descriptor of pregnant women. Id. at 860. 
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came to a head in Gonzales v. Carhart, in which the Supreme Court upheld the 
federal partial-birth abortion ban even though it did not include an exception 
for the pregnant woman’s health.
53
 
Although the very word choice in the Roe decision—the shift from 
“pregnant woman” to “mother”—showed that pregnant women were 
considered would-be mothers after the first trimester of pregnancy, Gonzales 
further propelled the conceptualization of all pregnant women as mothers. 
Gonzales explicitly invoked notions of maternal guilt to shame pregnant 
women seeking an abortion and change their minds.
54
 The majority opinion 
says: 
Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love the 
mother has for her child. . . . Whether to have an abortion requires a difficult 
and painful moral decision. While we find no reliable data to measure the 
phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to 
regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained. 
Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow.
55
 
The opinion continues: 
It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort must 
struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she 
learns, only after the event, what she once did not know: that she allowed a 
doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her 
unborn child, a child assuming the human form.
56
 
These passages emphasize that the Court views women as mothers before 
childbirth, that the role of “mother” impacts legal rights, and that the Court 
believes that motherhood should impact the choices women make.  
It cannot be overemphasized that the metaphysical transformation of 
pregnant women into mothers in abortion jurisprudence was done to women 
who were actively attempting to avoid the motherhood role at that time.
57
 So it 
should come as no surprise that in non-abortion contexts, invocations of the 
social role of mother is used to limit women’s reproductive and sexual 
autonomy. 
When stripped to its core, sexual and reproductive health jurisprudence 
(abortion and beyond) is founded on what this Article labels desexualization 
 
 53. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 164–65 (2007). 
 54. Id. at 184–85 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); B. Jessie Hill, Dangerous Terrain: Mapping the Female 
Body in Gonzales v. Carhart, 19 Colum. J. Gender & L. 649, 654–55 (2010). 
 55. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159 (internal citations omitted). The abortion procedure at issue is called “partial-
birth abortion,” evoking the ultimate experience of motherhood: birth. Id. at 125. 
 56. Id. at 159–60. 
 57. Casey, 505 U.S. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part) (“By restricting the right to terminate pregnancies, the State conscripts women’s bodies into 
its service, forcing women to continue their pregnancies, suffer the pains of childbirth, and in most instances, 
provide years of maternal care. The State does not compensate women for their services; instead, it assumes 
that they owe this duty as a matter of course.”); see Randi Hutter Epstein, Get Me Out: A History of Childbirth 
from the Garden of Eden to the Sperm Bank 114 (2010) (repeating the adage that women are made to bring 
children into the world); Balkin, supra note 50, at 851 (“[A]bortion laws treat women not as murderers, but as 
mothers, as people who exist to rear children.”). 
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and ritualization, both of which reinforce the notion, so apparent in abortion 
jurisprudence, that all women are or will be mothers and should be regulated 
(and should themselves act) as such. “Desexualization” is the mechanism by 
which the State expresses its moral disapproval of any type of sexual activity 
other than sex for parenthood and, as a corollary, treats even the actions of 
sexually active women (or women considering sexual activity) as tantamount 
to accepting motherhood. “Ritualization” is the legally sanctioned use of the 
rituals or rites of passage associated with continuing pregnancies to push 
women toward accepting motherhood and behaving as “good mothers” even to 
the detriment of their health or rights. Part II discusses the first of these tools, 
desexualization, and how it contributes to the law’s manufacturing of mothers. 
II.  Which Comes First: Sex or Motherhood? Law and Desexualizing 
Women 
There is no doubt that many women enjoy sex, but are they supposed 
to?
58
 Women are subjected to endless, sometimes conflicting, edicts about how 
and whether they should express their sexuality.
59
 Desexualizing women 
through the law minimizes the importance, or even denies the existence, of 
women’s desire for sex for pleasure and then re-characterizes women’s sexual 
actions as implicit acceptance of motherhood.
60
 It is the age-old division of 
women into Madonnas and whores.
61
 
Although the right of women to access contraceptives was recognized 
decades ago, regulation of and access to contraceptives have again emerged as 
legal issues.
62
 Two examples of this are the controversy surrounding 
contraceptive coverage in the ACA,
63
 and the regulation of oral emergency 
contraceptives, also called the morning-after pill, or referred to by the brand 
names “Plan B” or “Plan B One-Step.”
64
 In both contexts, women are 
desexualized, their desire to have sex for pleasure is delegitimized, and sexual 
 
 58. Joann Ellison Rodgers, Sex: A Natural History 8 (2001); Herbenick et al., supra note 3, at 255; 
Daniel Kahneman et al., A Survey Method for Characterizing Daily Life Experience: The Day Reconstruction 
Method, 306 Science 1776, 1777 (2004). Women also partake in—and sometimes lead companies in—the 
nearly two billion dollar adult toy industry. Angus Loten, Why Sex Sells More Than Ever, Inc. (Jan. 25, 2008), 
http://www.inc.com/articles/2008/01/sex.html. 
 59. Montemurro & Siefken, supra note 6, at 385; Cas Wouters, Sexualization: Have Sexualization 
Processes Changed Direction?, 13 Sexualities 723, 724–26 (2010). 
 60. Rosenbury & Rothman, supra note 1, at 809. But see Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the 
Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 777, 838 (1988) (“A list of acceptable inducements [to 
sex] would surely include procreation, emotional intimacy, and physical pleasure. Of these three inducements, 
procreation probably plays a less significant social role today than either intimacy or pleasure.”). 
 61. Stevi Jackson & Sue Scott, Sexual Skirmishes and Feminist Factions: Twenty-Five Years of Debate 
on Women and Sexuality, in Feminism and Sexuality: A Reader 3 (Stevi Jackson & Sue Scott eds., 1996). 
 62. See infra Parts II.B, C; see also Page, supra note 47, at 21 (asserting that some anti-abortion groups 
equate contraceptives and abortion). 
 63. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.); see 
infra Part II.B. 
 64. See infra Part II.C. 
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activity is re-characterized as an affirmative step toward motherhood. And, 
once again, any act that casts a woman as a “mother” expands the State’s 
ability to intervene in her choices. 
A. Defining Desexualization 
A core aspect of conceptualizing women as mothers in the law is viewing 
them—and treating them legally—as people who should engage in sexual 
activity for the purpose of parenthood, not pleasure: this is desexualization.
65
 
Desexualization consists of two actions: (1) shaming sex for pleasure and 
(2) reinforcing a norm that sex should be for the purpose of procreation or, for 
women more specifically, motherhood. 
In society, motherhood and sexuality are in opposition.
66
 A woman’s 
success as a mother is defined in part by perceptions about her sexuality; some 
studies find that a less sexual mother is deemed to be a better mother.
67
 The 
legal question, then, is when does a woman actually become a mother: upon a 
child’s birth or sometime before?
68
 Abortion jurisprudence demonstrates that 
the law labels a woman as a mother and her health “maternal” well before 
birth. But as the debates raging about contraceptives show, a woman may be 
conceptualized as a mother even before sex.
69
 
The path to the desexualization of women in the law has been circuitous. 
For example, the Supreme Court has not been entirely prudish when it has 
confronted the issue of contraception, but that does not mean that it openly 
accepts sex for pleasure. Early on, members of the Court in Poe v. Ullman 
signaled that they recognized the importance of marital intimacy.
70
 The Court 
 
 65. Reilly, supra note 28, at 204 (describing “the assumptions that women are morally responsible only 
when fulfilling traditional expectations of the mother-role”). “Desexualization” is used in many ways. See, 
e.g., Charles Winick, Desexualization in American Life 1–2 (1995) (recognizing that “changes were occurring 
in the social and sex roles, social structure, and popular culture” in the 1960s, when the book was written); 
Montemurro & Siefken, supra note 6, at 385 (using desexualization to refer to changes mothers experience 
post-partum); Wouters, supra note 59, at 726–28 (discussing desexualization in history, when sex was a duty 
and not for pleasure); see also Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991) (Title VII); Elizabeth F. 
Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1307, 
1401 (2009) (Disability); Anthony C. Infanti, The Internal Revenue Code as Sodomy Statute, 44 Santa Clara L. 
Rev. 763, 777 (2004) (Same-sex relationships); Morvareed Z. Salehpour, Election 2008: Sexism Edition: The 
Problem of Sex Stereotyping, 19 UCLA Women’s L.J. 117, 134–35 (2012) (Politics). 
 66. Montemurro & Siefken, supra note 6, at 367. See generally Ariella Friedman et al., Sexuality and 
Motherhood: Mutually Exclusive in Perception of Women, 38 Sex Roles 781 (1998). 
 67. Montemurro & Siefken, supra note 6, at 385; Friedman et al., supra note 66, at 796–99. 
 68. Beth A. Burkstrand-Reid, The More Things Change . . .: Abortion Politics & the Regulation of 
Assisted Reproductive Technology, 79 UMKC L. Rev. 361, 370–72 (2010) [hereinafter Burkstrand-Reid, The 
More Things Change]; Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions From Welfare 
“Reform,” Family, and Criminal Law, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 688, 689 (1998). 
 69. Page, supra note 47, at 30 (“[C]hildren are an intended purpose of intercourse, and parents should 
therefore act to responsibly care for and protect their pre-born children.”). 
 70. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 519–20 (Douglas, J., 
dissenting); Brenda Cossman, Sexual Citizens: The Legal and Cultural Regulation of Sex and Belonging 23–
24 (2007). 
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took a step toward recognizing the importance of sex for pleasure in Griswold 
v. Connecticut, which confirmed that married persons had the right to use 
contraceptives.
71
 The Griswold Court said that “intimacy” had a role in the 
lives of married couples (and thus in the lives of married women) but, as the 
decision did not dwell on sex itself, the precedent focused on relationship 
building rather than pleasure.
72
 By focusing on the marital relationship, 
Griswold also impliedly served a shaming function against sexually active 
people who were not married.
73
 
Later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court jumped into law and sexuality 
with both feet by confirming that “whatever the rights of the individual to 
access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried 
and the married alike.”
74
 But again, the right did not focus on sex for pleasure. 
The Court’s discomfort with sexuality lingered in tone, calling sex by the 
euphemism “the physical act.”
75
 Shaming was not overt, but the Court’s 
discomfort with sexual activity was.
76
 
The inevitable successor to the contraception cases—abortion 
jurisprudence—shows how the seed of the Court’s discomfort with sexuality 
grew into desexualization and, eventually, would be expressed in legislation 
and jurisprudence.
77
 Roe obscured the significance of physical intimacy by 
implicitly shaming sexually active women who were not married.
78
 Women 
seeking an abortion were pushed toward accepting the role of mother.
79
 
Roe’s companion case, Doe v. Bolton, further cast women having sex 
outside of marriage as sexually suspect. In Doe, the Court went out of its way 
to establish that the “situation did not involve extramarital sex and its product,” 
 
 71. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965). 
 72. Id. at 482 (“This law, however, operates directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife and 
their physician’s role in one aspect of that relation.”); see Law, supra note 2, at 226; see also Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003) (“After Griswold, it was established that the right to make certain decisions 
regarding sexual conduct extends beyond the marital relationship.”). 
 73. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498–99 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“Finally, it should be said of the Court’s 
holding today that it in no way interferes with a State’s proper regulation of sexual promiscuity or 
misconduct.”). 
 74. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); see Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 
92 Colum. L. Rev. 1431, 1446 (1992). 
 75. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 451 n.8. 
 76. The Court acknowledged, however, that sex for pleasure happened. Id. at 452–53 (“To say that 
contraceptives are immoral as such, and are to be forbidden to unmarried persons who will nevertheless persist 
in having intercourse, means that such persons must risk for themselves an unwanted pregnancy, for the child, 
illegitimacy, and for society, a possible obligation of support.”); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 77. Abortion regulations “impair the possibility of sexual pleasure for women, and aggravate the force of 
sexual fear.” Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and 
Questions of Equal Protection, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 261, 371 (1992). 
 78. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 120 (noting that Roe was not married); id. at 164 (stating the abortion 
decision “must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician”). 
 79. Id. at 120, 164–65. But see Posner, supra note 19, at 333 (discussing the Roe decision as one 
supporting “morally indifferent sex”); see Courtney Megan Cahill, Abortion and Disgust, 48 Harv. C.R.-C.L. 
L. Rev. 409, 442 (2013) (discussing how abortion stigma relates to “shame associated with conduct that 
defines deeply rooted beliefs about women’s social and biological roles”). 
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implying that women who do not transgress that boundary are somehow more 
worthy of constitutional protection than those who do.
80
 The Court’s decision 
exemplifies how motherhood is treated as a “social institution,” one that 
facilitates the control of women: in this case, their sexuality.
81
 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey further retreated from Eisenstadt’s limited 
recognition of sex for pleasure. Although Casey recognizes that intimate 
decisionmaking relies to some degree on the availability of abortion, the 
decision, in part, grounded women’s right to choose abortion in their ability to 
succeed as workers.
82
 Sex and pregnancy were, at least in part, treated as 
economic issues and, at least impliedly, not issues of pleasure.
83
 Casey 
abandoned Roe’s trimester framework in favor of the amorphous “undue 
burden” standard.
84
 In Casey, the State interest in women’s health begins to 
become a veil for a more politicized interest—the pre-viable fetus.
85
 This 
interest in the pre-viable fetus further catapulted women toward motherhood.
86
 
The government’s ability to directly regulate sex was arguably curtailed 
by Lawrence v. Texas, in which the Supreme Court struck down a Texas 
sodomy statute, but Lawrence may have had as much—if not more—to do 
with preserving an individual’s interest in building intimate relationships than 
in an individual’s interest in sex in and of itself.
87
 Even as it discussed Casey, 
Lawrence tied the right to engage in homosexual conduct to “persons in a 
homosexual relationship.”
88
 In Gonzales, however, the relationship at issue 
turned from one between adults to one between the pregnant woman and her 
fetus, directly implicating motherhood. 
Gonzales linked women’s sexuality to the rights of the fetus and thus 
propelled women toward motherhood.
89
 Gonzales imbues the sexual act itself 
 
 80. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 196 (1973). 
 81. Friedman et al., supra note 66, at 783. 
 82. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (“The ability of women to participate 
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their 
reproductive lives.”). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 878–79 (retaining Roe’s life and health exceptions, using both “woman” and “mother,” and 
reaffirming Roe’s viability-related holding). 
 85. Id. at 872–73; Caitlin E. Borgmann, Winter Count: Taking Stock of Abortion Rights After Casey and 
Carhart, 31 Fordham Urb. L.J. 675, 681 (2004). 
 86. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (“To promote the State’s profound interest in potential life, throughout 
pregnancy the State may take measures to ensure that the woman’s choice is informed, and measures designed 
to advance this interest will not be invalidated as long as their purpose is to persuade the woman to choose 
childbirth over abortion. These measures must not be an undue burden on the right.”). 
 87. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (“The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship 
that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without 
being punished as criminals. This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to 
define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an 
institution the law protects.”); Kaplan, supra note 2 (arguing that Lawrence was less about sex and more about 
relationships). 
 88. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573–74 (emphasis added). 
 89. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007). 
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with the intent to parent: it warns women, addressing them as mothers, that 
they may regret ending “the infant life they once created and sustained” and 
cautioned that the woman’s health may suffer from a decision to abort.
90
 This 
so-called “fetal personhood” rhetoric implies that, once conceived, a fetus is a 
separate person with rights, thus, it has a mother.
91
 Women are told that they 
“should become instantaneously ‘motherly’ from the moment of conception.”
92
 
This contributes to what some call “maternal-fetal conflict,” the purported 
clash of rights between a pregnant woman and the fetus.
93
 Thus, women 
remain desexualized, purportedly destined to be mothers and expected to 
behave as such. If the State “couldn’t stop growing numbers of women from 
climbing into the sexual driver’s seat, they could at least make the women’s 
drive more dangerous—by jamming the reproductive controls,” and courts 
facilitate that move.
94
 
B. Sluts or Mothers: “Pre-Pregnant” Women, Desexualization, and 
Obamacare
95
 
Sex conjures notions of unbridled passion but also of unconstrained 
power, especially when it comes to women having sex for pleasure.
96
 By using 
contraceptives, sexually active women gain some measure of legal autonomy 
by exhibiting power over their bodies and lives. However, there is a growing 
backlash against access to contraceptives, which reflects the view that “real 
women have babies”: they do not have sex for pleasure, which requires 
contraceptives; they only have sex for procreation, which does not.
97
 As these 
laws become more entrenched, women will continue to be desexualized 
through contraception policy, litigation, and regulation. 
 
 90. Id. Researchers have questioned the Court’s implication that women who have an abortion suffer 
from mental health problems as a result. See Vignetta E. Charles et al., Abortion and Long-Term Mental 
Health Outcomes: A Systematic Review of the Evidence, 78 Contraception 436, 445–49 (2008) (finding that 
high-quality research has suggested few if any negative mental health differences between women who have 
and have not had abortions). 
 91. Caitlin E. Borgmann, The Meaning of “Life”: Belief and Reason in the Abortion Debate, 18 Colum J. 
Gender & L. 551, 562 (2009). 
 92. Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Abortion And Woman’s Choice: The State, Sexuality, and Reproductive 
Freedom 341 (rev. ed. 1990); see Hill, supra note 54, at 663–64. 
 93. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Conceptualizing Violence Against Pregnant Women, 81 Indiana L.J. 667, 
688–95 (2006). For an extensive discussion of the regulation of pregnancy, see Ikemoto, Code of Perfect 
Pregnancy, supra note 21. 
 94. Susan Faludi, Backlash: The Undeclared War Against American Women 405 (1991). 
 95. See January W. Payne, Forever, Wash. Post (May 16, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/05/15/AR2006051500875.html (discussing the treatment of women as “pre-
pregnant”); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in 
scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). 
 96. Cossman, supra note 70, at 24–25 (stating that “patrolling the borders” of when sex is and is not 
legitimate still took place after Roe); Klein, supra note 7, at 3; Friedman et al., supra note 66, at 783 (“As long as a 
woman’s sexuality remains in the family sphere and is channeled to procreation, it receives full legitimacy. When 
her sexuality is ‘uncontrolled’ it is seen as illegitimate and is criticized and penalized.”). 
 97. Valenti, supra note 25, at 151–52. 
5. Burkstrand-Reid_28 (Do Not Delete) – DRAFT: DO NOT CITE 12/1/2013 11:33 AM 
December 2013]     SEX FOR PLEASURE 227 
Ninety-nine percent of sexually active women use contraception at some 
point in their lives, making its use “virtually universal” in the United States.
98
 
More specifically, a survey of women conducted between 2006 and 2008 
found that eighty-two percent of women have used oral contraceptives and ten 
percent have used emergency contraceptives—more than double the proportion 
of women who had used emergency contraceptives in 2002.
99
 According to the 
Guttmacher Institute, the “typical American woman” who wants two children 
must use some mechanism of contraception for three decades.
100
 The 
connection between contraception and women’s health, broadly defined, is 
clear: contraceptives reduce maternal mortality and improve maternal-fetal 
outcomes by preventing unplanned pregnancies.
101
 Contraceptives also have 
numerous other health benefits for women, including protection against certain 
cancers.
102
 
The morality of contraception—or of sex for pleasure—resurfaced 
dramatically recently due to the ACA mandate requiring “women’s preventive 
health care—such as mammograms, screenings for cervical cancer, prenatal 
care, and other services—generally must be covered by health plans with no 
cost sharing” including “[c]ontraceptive methods and counseling.”
103
 This 
mandate infuriated some employers and state governments, which alleged that 
the mandate violated religious freedom by forcing some employers not 
qualified for a religious exemption under the ACA to cover health services—
such as contraceptives—that conflict with their faith.
104
 Implicit in the 
 
 98. Mosher & Jones, supra note 13, at 5 (stating that nearly one hundred percent of sexually active 
women ages fifteen to forty-four surveyed from 2006 to 2008 who have ever had intercourse with a man have 
at some point in their lifetime used contraceptives, natural or artificial). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Rachel Benson Gold et al., Guttmacher Inst., Next Steps for America’s Family Planning Program: 
Leveraging the Potential of Medicaid and Title X in an Evolving Health Care System 6 (2009). 
 101. Marcia P. Harrigan & Suzanne M. Baldwin, Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, in Dimensions 
of Human Behavior: The Changing Life Course 53, 56–57 (Elizabeth D. Hutchinson ed., 2d ed. 2003); see 
Kenneth R. Weiss, Contraception Key to Reducing Child, Maternal Deaths, Experts Say, L.A. Times (July 12, 
2013), http://www.latimes.com/news/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-contraception-key-to-reducing-child-
maternal-deaths-experts-say-20130712,0,1549550.story. 
 102. Boston Women’s Health Book Collective, Our Bodies, Ourselves 225 (2011) [hereinafter Our 
Bodies, Ourselves]. 
 103. See Health Resources & Servs. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Women’s Preventive 
Services Guidelines, http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines (last visited Oct. 6, 2013); see also Remarks by the 
President on Preventive Care (Feb. 10, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ the-press-
office/2012/02/10/remarks-president-preventive-care. For a collection of news articles on healthcare reform, see 
also Health Care Reform, N.Y. Times (Times Topics), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/ 
news/health/diseasesconditionsandhealthtopics/health_insurance_and_managed_care/ 
health_care_reform/index.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2013). 
 104. Caroline Mala Corbin, The Contraception Mandate, 107 N.W. U.L. Rev. Colloquy 151, 151 (2012); 
7 States Sue Over Obama Administration’s Birth Control Rule, USA Today (Feb. 23, 2012), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2012-02-23/states-sue-obama-birth-
control/53228212/1; Warren Richey, Obama Administration Backs Out of Appeal Over New Contraceptive 
Mandate, Christian Sci. Monitor (May 6, 2013, 8:58 PM), http://www.csmonitor.com/ 
USA/Justice/2013/0506/Obama-administration-backs-out-of-appeal-over-new-contraceptive-mandate-video; 
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objections is the notion that sex for pleasure should not be subsidized, 
suggesting that sex for procreation is the only appropriate type of sex.
105
 
President Obama later offered compromises concerning the contraception 
mandate, attempting to assuage employers’ concerns, though those 
compromises did little to avert litigation over the validity of the ACA.
106
 
On one hand, the ACA contraception mandate can be seen as the 
quintessential government recognition that women do have sex for pleasure—
and should be able to have sex for pleasure—without suffering from undesired 
consequences. The pushback on the ACA by other government actors, 
employers, media pundits, states, and individual lawmakers, however, 
emphasizes the vast the disapproval of women’s non-procreative sexuality.
107
 
One prime example: Sandra Fluke. 
Fluke, then a law student at Georgetown University, was scheduled to 
testify before Congress on the importance of contraceptive coverage but was 
refused by the United States House Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform.
108
 She later testified before a panel of House Democrats.
109
 Her 
testimony was followed by comments from media personality Rush Limbaugh: 
What does it say about the college coed Susan Fluke [sic], who goes before a 
congressional committee and essentially says that she must be paid to have 
sex? What does that make her? It makes her a slut, right? It makes her a 
prostitute. She wants to be paid to have sex. She’s having so much sex she 
can’t afford the contraception. She wants you and me and the taxpayers to 
pay her to have sex. What does that make us? We’re the pimps.
110
 
By lobbying for contraceptive coverage, Fluke was “happily presenting 
herself as an immoral, baseless, no-purpose-to-her life woman;” attending an 
elite law school and becoming a lawyer was not a legitimate life purpose for a 
 
HHS Mandate Information Central, Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, 
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2013) (identifying 67 cases and more 
than 200 plaintiffs). The type of contraceptive objected to varies. FAQs: Becket Fund’s Lawsuits Against HHS, 
Becket Fund For Religious Liberty, http://www.becketfund.org/faq/#f5 (last visited Oct. 23 2013) (“Although 
many of these institutions do not have objections to traditional contraception, all are opposed to abortion-
inducing drugs, such as the ‘morning after pill’ and ‘week after pill.’”) 
 105. Certainly, some women who use contraceptives are already mothers in that they have given birth to 
children. The analysis applies to these women, too, as they may be attempting to prevent additional 
pregnancies. 
 106. Morgan Whitaker, Obama Tweaks Birth Control Mandate to Accommodate Religious Groups, 
MSNBC.com (Feb. 1, 2013, 1:15 PM), http://tv.msnbc.com/2013/02/01/obama-clarifies-contraception-
mandate-to-accomodate-religious-groups; see 45 C.F.R. § 147.130-131 (2013) (outlining the requirements for 
a “religious employer”). 
 107. See infra notes 114–116. 
 108. Alexa Keyes, Contraception Controversy Continues: Meet Witness Sandra Fluke, ABC News 
(Feb. 23, 2012, 2:34 PM) http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/02/contraception-controversy-continues-
meet-witness-sandra-fluke. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Media Matters Staff, Limbaugh: Student Denied Spot at Contraception Hearing Says “She Must Be 
Paid to Have Sex,” So She’s A “Slut” and “Prostitute”, Media Matters for Am. (Feb. 29, 2012, 2:46 PM), 
http://mediamatters.org/video/2012/02/29/limbaugh-student-denied-spot-at-contraception-h/186411 (providing 
a recording and transcript of Rush Limbaugh’s comments about Sandra Fluke). 
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woman, and, if there was any legitimacy in that endeavor, the potential of any 
woman to have non-procreative sex overshadowed her accomplishments.
111
 
Fluke was forced into the role of mother-in-waiting because she was assumed 
to be sexually active. And, the only legitimate “purpose to her life,” if she had 
sex, would be to procreate. 
Limbaugh may have been the most famous talking head to address the 
contraception mandate, and his comments were histrionic at best, but he is far 
from the only prominent person to publically decry the law. Company after 
company, school after school, state after state, and lawmaker after lawmaker 
fought contraceptive coverage, even directly challenging the value of sex for 
pleasure.
112
 Former presidential candidate Rick Santorum, the state of 
Nebraska, Hobby Lobby, and Domino’s Pizza are just a few.
113
 
Regardless of whether the asserted sexual authority of the religious right 
trumps the autonomy of women as the ACA winds its way through the courts, 
any failure to cover contraceptives—and, therefore, recognize sexuality—
contributes to women’s desexualization in society. These attacks thus buttress 
entrenchment of desexualization by the State by eliminating resources that 
would allow women the ability to avoid or delay motherhood. This is the 
essence of desexualization. 
The ACA controversy demonstrates that desexualization and its 
relationship with law and public policy begins long before pregnancy.
114
 But 
the contraception mandate controversy is merely a gateway to how law and 
policy express desexualization. Desexualization intensifies as a tool for 
transforming women into mothers when women have already had sex and are 
dealing with a potential consequence: pregnancy. 
 
 111. Media Matters Staff, UPDATED: Limbaugh’s Misogynistic Attack On Georgetown Law Student 
Continues With Increased Vitriol, Media Matters for Am. (Mar. 1, 2012, 3:26 PM), 
http://mediamatters.org/blog/2012/03/01/updated-limbaughs-misogynistic-attack-on-george/184248 (providing 
summary and recording of Rush Limbaugh’s comments). 
 112. Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, supra note 104 (detailing lawsuits filed over the ACA mandate); 
Irin Carmon, Rick Santorum is Coming for Your Birth Control, Salon (Jan. 4, 2012, 6:30 PM), 
http://www.salon.com/2012/01/04/rick_santorum_is_coming_for_your_birth_control. 
 113. See, e.g., Monaghan v. Sebelius, No. 12-15488, 2013 WL 1014026, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 14, 2013); 
Bruning v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 877 F. Supp. 2d 777, 779 (D. Neb. 2012); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 
v. Sebelius, No. 12-1000, 2013 WL 3869832, at *1 (W.D. Okla. July 19, 2013); Terry Baynes, U.S. Court Accepts 
Challenge to Obama Contraception Rule, Reuters (June 28, 2013, 2:07 AM), 
http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/06/27/us-hobby-lobby-contraception-idINBRE95Q15N20130627; see also, 
Carmon, supra note 112. 
 114. Preventative care is sometimes referred to as “[p]reconception and interconception care,” which are 
“health care services and supports that are provided prior to a pregnancy . . . designed to assure that women are 
healthy before conception in order to improve pregnancy-related outcomes.” Carolyn Mullen, The Affordable 
Care Act and Preconception Health, Pulse 9–10, Nov. 2011, available at 
http://www.amchp.org/AboutAMCHP/Newsletters/Pulse/Documents/Pulse_November11.pdf. 
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C. Motherhood the Morning After 
Women trying to avoid pregnancy can use pre-intercourse contraceptives, 
some without a prescription and some, including oral contraceptives, with a 
prescription.
115
 There are also oral, post-coital contraceptives, sometimes 
called emergency contraception, the morning-after pill, or the brand names 
“Plan B” or “Plan B One-Step.”
116
 Recently, some emergency contraceptives 
were made available without a prescription, but availability was restricted on 
the basis of age.
117
 Efforts to make some emergency contraceptives available 
without a prescription and without age restrictions carried on for years and 
only recently achieved some success.
118
 
Emergency contraception does not implicate motherhood or maternal 
health: there is no “mother” involved.
119
 The concept of “maternal” health 
generally, and abortion more specifically, should have no bearing on the 
regulation of emergency contraceptives, which prevent—not end—
pregnancy.
120
 Yet as the controversies surrounding the availability of 
emergency contraceptives show, engaging in intercourse may signal that a 
woman has accepted the role of mother, even as she tries to prevent 
motherhood. 
Similar to pre-coital contraceptives,
121
 emergency contraceptives prevent 
pregnancy by stopping ovulation.
122
 Emergency contraceptives must be taken 
 
 115. Planned Parenthood, Birth Control Pills, http://www.plannedparenthood.org/health-topics/birth-
control/birth-control-pill-4228.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) (reporting that pills cost as much as $50 per 
month and a medical exam prior to getting them, at a cost of up to $250, may be necessary). 
 116. There are numerous types of emergency contraceptives. See Types of Emergency Contraception, The 
Emergency Contraception Website, http://ec.princeton.edu/questions/brands-usa.html (last visited Oct. 6, 
2013) (providing information from the Office of Population Research at Princeton University and the 
Association of Reproductive Health Professionals on various types of oral emergency contraceptives); Copper-
T IUD as Emergency Contraception, The Emergency Contraception Website, 
http://ec.princeton.edu/info/eciud.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) (describing the use of an IUD as emergency 
contraception). Emergency contraception or contraceptives in this Article refers to oral emergency 
contraception or contraceptives. See Emergency Contraception State Laws, Nat’l Conference of State 
Legislators, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/ emergency-contraception-state-laws.aspx (last updated 
Aug. 2012) (discussing state emergency contraception regulations, including dispensing by pharmacists). 
 117. See News Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves Plan B One-Step Emergency Contraceptive 
for Use Without a Prescription for All Women of Child-Bearing Potential (June 20, 2013), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm358082.htm [hereinafter FDA 
Approves Plan B One-Step Without Prescription] (saying Plan B One-Step was approved in 2009 for use by 
women age seventeen and over; the age was lowered to fifteen in April 2013). 
 118. Id. (approving Plan B One-Step for all women on a non-prescription basis); Tummino v. Hamburg, 
Memorandum, No. 12-0763, 2013 WL 2631163, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 12, 2013) (discussing levonorgestrel-
based contraceptives). 
 119. See Mother Definition, supra note 10. 
 120. How Emergency Contraception Works, The Emergency Contraception Website, 
http://ec.princeton.edu/questions/ecabt.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2013). 
 121. FDA Approves Plan B One-Step Without Prescription, supra note 117 (“The product contains higher 
levels of a hormone found in some types of daily use oral hormonal contraceptive pills and works in a similar 
way to these contraceptive pills by stopping ovulation and therefore preventing pregnancy.”). For general 
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quickly after intercourse in order to maximize efficacy.
123
 Although some anti-
reproductive-rights advocates argue that emergency contraceptives may 
prevent a fertilized egg from implanting in the uterus, scientists say there is no 
evidence that emergency contraceptives function in that capacity.
124
 In other 
words, studies—and the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)—contend 
that emergency contraceptives do not end an established pregnancy.
125
 Still, 
some argue that emergency contraceptives are abortifacients. For example, the 
American Right to Life organization says that “the greatest danger of the 
‘Morning After Pill’ is that it is designed to kill a child.”
126
 
In addition to the initial, prescription-only status of emergency 
contraceptives, access to the medications has been restricted in other ways. The 
federal government, until recently, restricted availability based on age.
127
 
Additionally, pharmacists—and perhaps even others—may be allowed to 
refuse to dispense emergency contraceptives. 
The sexuality of young women is perhaps the most feared sexuality of all 
as, in most cases, it is overtly sex for pleasure.
128
 It can also have massive, 
unintended ramifications in terms of unplanned pregnancy.
129
 
 
information on oral contraceptives, see FAQ: Birth Control Pills, Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists 
(Mar. 2013), http://www.acog.org/~/media /For%20Patients/ faq021.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20130619T2102509049. 
 122. Pam Belluck, Abortion Qualms on Morning-After Pill May Be Unfounded, N.Y. Times (June 5, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/health/research/morning-after-pills-dont-block-implantation-
science-suggests.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (asserting that the debate over how emergency contraceptives 
work has been largely resolved and that it is not an abortifacient, but discussing contrary views). 
 123. FAQ: Emergency Contraception, Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists(Aug. 2011), 
http://www.acog.org/~/media/For%20Patients/faq114.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20130619T2106435514. 
 124. Id.; Belluck, supra note 122. 
 125. See FDA Approves Plan B One-Step Without Prescription, supra note 117 (“Plan B One-Step will 
not stop a pregnancy when a woman is already pregnant and there is no medical evidence that the product will 
harm a developing fetus.”); Belluck, supra note 122 (citing Mayo Clinic physicians, National Institutes of 
Health, and International Federation of Gynecology and Obstetrics officials as saying emergency contraception 
does not work post-fertilization). 
 126. Plan B Side Effect On Younger and Younger Girls, Am. Right to Life, 
http://americanrtl.org/news/plan-b-side-effect-daughters (last visited Oct. 6, 2013); see Elizabeth Shadigian, 
Letter to the FDA Regarding Over-The-Counter Status For Plan B, Am. Ass’n of Pro-Life Obstetricians & 
Gynecologists, http://www.aaplog.org/position-and-papers/emergency-contraception/letter-to-the-fda-
regarding-over-the-counter-status-for-plan-b (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) (“Plan B’s labeling does not give 
adequate notice to a potential user that Plan B may prevent the implantation of a human embryo (e.g., a 
fertilized ovum) as one mechanism of action, thus acting as an abortifacient.”); Plan B [Emergency Abortion 
Pill] FAQs, Pharmacists for Life Int’l, http://www.pfli.org/main.php?pfli=planbfaq (last visited Oct. 6, 2013). 
 127. See Plan B: Questions and Answers, Food & Drug Admin., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ 
DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/ucm109783.htm (last updated Dec. 14, 
2006) (announcing Plan B approval over-the-counter for women eighteen years and older). 
 128. See generally Sinikka Elliott, Not My Kid: What Parents Believe About the Sex Lives of Their 
Teenagers (2012) (discussing the disconnect between actual sexual activity and parental perceptions of it); 
Amy T. Schalet, Not Under My Roof: Parents, Teens, and the Culture of Sex (2011) (comparing U.S. attitudes 
toward teen sex with other countries); Deborah L. Tolman, Dilemmas of Desire: Teenage Girls Talk about 
Sexuality (2002) (discussing fear over girls’ sexuality); Valenti, Purity Myth, supra note 6 (discussing the 
harm girls face from lacking a comprehensive understanding of sexuality); In Brief: Fact Sheet, Facts on 
American Teens’ Sexual and Reproductive Health, Guttmacher Inst. (June 2013), 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FB-ATSRH.html (reporting that fewer than two percent of adolescents 
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In 2011, Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen 
Sebelius refused to follow the guidance of FDA staff, who recommended that 
Plan B One-Step be made more widely available to young women without a 
prescription.
130
 She rejected the recommendations of her own agency and said 
that there was insufficient proof that young women could understand how to 
use the drug or the consequences of its use.
131
 Ultimately, her actions were 
called “obviously political” by a federal district court judge, who ordered the 
FDA to “make levonorgestrel-based emergency contraceptives available 
without a prescription and without point-of-sale or age restrictions.”
132
 
Eventually, after the Second Circuit denied in part the government’s request 
for a stay pending appeal, the Obama administration capitulated: Plan B One-
Step was made available without a prescription or point-of-sale restrictions 
regardless of a woman’s age (assuming that a woman can afford it and is not 
otherwise obstructed from accessing it).
133
 Obstructions, however, are likely; 
 
younger than twelve are sexually active, sixteen percent by age fifteen, one-third by age sixteen, and that 
750,000 teens between fifteen and nineteen years old get pregnant each year). A minor’s right to access 
contraceptives has long been controversial, as is seen in the fragmented decision in Carey v. Population 
Control Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), and discussed in Angela Patterson, Carey v. Population Services 
International: Minors’ Right to Access Contraceptives, 14 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 469 (2004); see also State 
Policies in Brief, Minors’ Access to Contraceptive Services, Guttmacher Inst. (Aug. 1, 2013), 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MACS.pdf. 
 129. Teen Pregnancy Prevention, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/health/teen-pregnancy-prevention.aspx (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) (“Teenage mothers are less likely to 
finish high school and are more likely than their peers to live in poverty, depend on public assistance, and be in 
poor health. Their children are more likely to suffer health and cognitive disadvantages, come in contact with 
the child welfare and correctional systems, live in poverty, drop out of high school and become teen parents 
themselves. According to the National Campaign to Prevent Teen and Unplanned Pregnancy, the annual public 
cost of teen childbearing—due to higher costs of public health care, foster care, incarceration and lost tax 
revenue—is nearly $11 billion.”).  
 130. News Release, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., A Statement by U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius (Dec. 7, 2011), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ 
news/press/2011pres/12/20111207a.html [hereinafter Sebelius Statement] (using the terms “Plan B One-Step”, 
“emergency contraceptive,” and “morning after pill” in the release). 
 131. News Release, Food & Drug Admin., Statement from FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg, M.D., 
on Plan B One-Step (Dec. 7, 2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/ Newsroom/ucm282805.htm 
[hereinafter Hamburg Statement]; Sebelius Statement, supra note 130; Sam Baker, Left ‘Speechless’ as 
Sebelius Overrules FDA on Access to Morning-After Pill, The Hill (Dec. 7, 2011), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/abortion/197825-sebelius-overrules-fda-blocks-access-to-plan-b 
(discussing the notion that the secretary “bow[ed] to political pressure” and ignored her own agency’s 
scientists); HHS Overrules FDA, Limiting Plan B for Teens Under 17, USA Today (Dec. 8, 2011), 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/healthcare/health/healthcare/story/2011-12-07/FDA-debates-over-the-
counter-morning-after-pill/51699388/1. 
 132. Tummino v. Hamburg, No. 12-0763, 2013 WL 1348656, at *7, *31 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2013). This 
was not the first time the district court noted political interference in emergency contraception regulation. 
Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 547–50 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (ordering the FDA to make Plan B available 
to women age 17 without a prescription). 
 133. Tummino v. Hamburg, No. 13-1690, 2013 WL 2435370, at *1 (2d Cir. June 5, 2013) (“Insofar as the 
district court order requires Appellants to immediately provide over-the-counter access to the one-pill variants 
of emergency contraceptives, a stay, pending appeal, is granted. Insofar as the order mandates immediate over-
the-counter access to the two-pill variants of emergency contraceptives, a stay is denied because the 
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despite the non-prescription status and lack of age restrictions for Plan B One-
Step, pharmacists have already said they may continue to keep it behind the 
counter and limit access by age.
134
 
From a policy perspective, the regulation of emergency contraception for 
minors exposes a paradox. If we break down desexualization, we see that it 
involves two steps: (1) a shaming of sex for pleasure, and (2) a push toward 
motherhood. The first move of desexualization may seem appropriate when it 
comes to young women.
135
 However, taking the second step and pushing 
young women toward motherhood is counterintuitive. Once unprotected sex 
has occurred, opponents of non-prescription emergency contraceptives for 
younger women appear to fear the possibility of promiscuity among young 
women more than they fear teen pregnancy, even though studies show the 
availability of emergency contraceptives does not increase sexual activity.
136
 
This is remarkable; once they have sex, young women were—and arguably 
still are—pushed toward motherhood seemingly as a punishment either for 
failure to use contraceptives or for being sexually active at all.
137
 This is 
desexualization. Whether young or not, women are not to have sex for pleasure 
and, if they do, they are deemed to have accepted the role of mother, no matter 
their age. 
Government actions to limit the availability of emergency contraceptives 
propel women toward motherhood and do so without providing health 
information related to pregnancy. Sebelius, for example, said that young girls 
might not understand the Plan B One-Step label, justifying limitations on its 
availability.
138
 Her actions suggested that young women could not make good 
 
Appellants have failed to meet the requisite standard.”). FDA Approves Plan B One-Step Without a 
Prescription, supra note 117; Letter from U.S. Attorney, E.D.N.Y. Loretta E. Lynch to Hon. Edward R. 
Korman (June 10, 2013), available at http://media.npr.org/documents/ 2013/jun/justiceletter.pdf (asserting that 
the government had complied with the Court’s prior judgment and that the FDA “will not at this time take 
steps” to change the status of other emergency contraceptives). For information regarding the regulatory status 
of other contraceptives, see Where Should EC Be? FDA-Approved Emergency Contraceptive Products as of 
August 1, 2013, Reprod. Health Techs. Project, http://www.rhtp.org/contraception/emergency/documents/ 
WhereShouldECBe.August12013.pdf.  
 134. Meeri Kim, Questions About Effect of Over-The-Counter Plan B for All Ages, Wash. Post (June 29, 
2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-29/national/40268209_1_emergency-contraception-plan-b-
one-step-age-restrictions. 
 135. But see Valenti, Purity Myth, supra note 6, at 9–10 (arguing that the focus on virginity discourages 
girls from safe expressions of sexuality). 
 136. Klein, supra note 7, at 38; see Carey v. Population Control Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 694–95 (1977) 
(quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972)). But see Editorial: Docs Push Plan B: Putting Girls’ 
Health at Risk to Prevent Pregnancy, Wash. Times (Nov. 29, 2012), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/nov/29/docs-push-plan-b. 
 137. See supra note 136. See generally Valenti, Purity Myth, supra note 6 (discussing how girls are taught 
to fear their sexuality). 
 138. Compare Hamburg Statement, supra note 131 (“[Plan B One-Step] was safe and effective in 
adolescent females, that adolescent females understood the product was not for routine use, and that the 
product would not protect them against sexually transmitted diseases. Additionally, the data supported a 
finding that adolescent females could use Plan B One-Step properly without the intervention of a healthcare 
provider.”), with Sebelius Statement, supra note 130 (“the actual use study and the label comprehension study 
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health decisions related to contraception, but at the same time, young women’s 
ability to make good health decisions related to pregnancy—which carries with 
it health risks, too—were not discussed in her statement, thus undermining any 
argument that the Plan B One-Step restriction was intended as a health 
protection.
139
 Her invocation of girls’ health to deny access to emergency 
contraceptives was particularly disingenuous given that the drug was still 
available to girls by prescription.
140
 According to prominent physicians, “[a]ny 
objective review makes it clear that Plan B is more dangerous to politicians 
than to adolescent girls.”
141
 We will see this misleading use of women’s health 
against women’s autonomy again in the context of abortion and cesarean 
sections.
142
 
Moreover, some states have enacted laws that allow some healthcare 
providers to deny women access to reproductive health services.
143
 These laws 
were first passed in response to Roe and allow medical providers, among other 
actions, to refuse to dispense drugs that may conflict with their moral or 
religious beliefs.
144
 Changes in the way that emergency contraceptives are 
dispensed may lessen the potential impact of pharmacist refusal. However, 
opportunities for pharmacists and other employees of retailers that sell Plan B 
One-Step to obstruct access will undoubtedly still exist.
145
 
Refusing to dispense emergency contraceptives is tantamount to declaring 
a sexually active woman to be “pregnant,” and thus a mother, the instant she 
has sex.
146
 Women are explicitly desexualized through these clauses. When 
healthcare providers refuse to dispense emergency contraceptives, they push 
women toward motherhood, often with State support.
147
 
 
are not sufficient to support making Plan B One-Step available to all girls 16 and younger, without talking to a 
health care professional.”); Ikemoto, The Realignment of Women’s Health, supra note 43, at 766. 
 139. See generally Heidi Murkoff & Sharon Mazel, What to Expect When You’re Expecting (2008) 
(discussing various health risks women face when pregnant). 
 140. Tummino v. Hamburg, No. 12-0763, 2013 WL 1348656, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2013). 
 141. Alastair J.J. Wood et al., The Politics of Emergency Contraception, 366 New Eng. J. Med. 101, 102 
(2012). 
 142. See infra Part III. 
 143. State “conscience clause” laws allow medical providers to deny healthcare services based on their 
individual beliefs. Pharmacist Conscience Clauses Laws and Information, Nat’l Conference of State 
Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/pharmacist-conscience-clauses-laws-and-
information.aspx (last updated May 2012); State Policies in Brief, Refusing to Provide Health Services, 
Guttmacher Inst. (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/ spib_RPHS.pdf.  
 144. Id.; see Burkstrand-Reid, The Invisible Woman, supra note 51, at 114–22. 
 145. Kim, supra note 134. 
 146. Id. See Pharmacy Refusals 101, Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr. (Apr. 24, 2012), 
http://www.nwlc.org/resource/pharmacy-refusals-101 (“In Milwaukee, Wisconsin, a mother of six went to her 
local Walgreens with a prescription for emergency contraception. The pharmacist refused to fill the 
prescription and berated the mother in the pharmacy’s crowded waiting area, shouting ‘You’re a murderer! I 
will not help you kill this baby . . . .’ She subsequently became pregnant and had an abortion.”). 
 147. Some people even feel so strongly that all sex is procreative that they think women who are sexually 
assaulted should welcome the role of motherhood even if it is—literally—forced up on them. John Avlon, 
GOP Policy is the Scandal, Not Just Akin’s Comments, CNN (Aug. 21, 2012), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/21/opinion/avlon-akin-gop/index.html; Mark Memmott, “God Intended” A 
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Whether expressed by a private employer or by a government official, 
desexualization is identifiable in the law. When it came to the ACA, we saw 
desexualization by public and private actors challenging the mandated 
coverage of contraceptives. In terms of emergency contraception, we see 
desexualization in the actions of regulatory officials. In both contexts, 
desexualization is used to propel women toward motherhood. As a 
consequence, women are impliedly told prior to intercourse that sex is only 
sanctioned if it is done for the purposes of becoming a parent, thus further 
facilitating the legal regulation of sexual and reproductive decisionmaking. 
III.  The Curious Disappearance of the Pregnant Woman: Using Rituals to 
Promote Motherhood
148
 
Motherhood is treated as a “female rite of passage” that marks a woman’s 
value and status.
149
 For a woman, rejecting motherhood is tantamount to 
rejecting her core societal role.
150
 Using contraceptives is counter to the role 
women are supposed to play. 
Whether a woman seeks to end a pregnancy or to continue it, 
desexualization continues through the regulation of women’s sexual and 
reproductive health.
151
 After all, a less-sexual woman may be seen as a better 
mother.
152
 But being pregnant does not necessarily mean that one will become 
a “mother,” let alone the good, all-sacrificing mother that society demands. 
Manufacturing mothers after conception also requires what this Article calls 
ritualization: first, making pregnant women seeking an abortion participate in 
the same medical rituals that women continuing pregnancies are directed to 
undertake, and second, for women who decide to continue their pregnancy, 
using their participation or lack of participation in certain rituals to indicate 
whether they will be “good mothers.” Desexualization and ritualization work 
in tandem in reproductive health law to cast women as mothers. 
 
Pregnancy Caused by Rape, Indiana Candidate Says, Nat’l Pub. Radio (Oct. 24, 2012, 7:15 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2012/10/24/163529166/god-intended-a-pregnancy-caused-by-rape-
indiana-candidate-says. But see Goldstein, supra note 12, at 13 (saying that rape victims may not be expected 
to take on the mothering role because they did not consent to having sex). 
 148. Another area of ritualization is infertility treatment. For an exploration of the relationship between 
abortion jurisprudence and assisted reproductive technology, see generally Burkstrand-Reid, The More Things 
Change, supra note 68, and Jody Lyneé Madeira, Woman Scorned?: Resurrecting Infertile Women’s Decision-
Making Autonomy, 71 Md. L. Rev. 339 (2012). 
 149. Martha McMahon, Engendering Motherhood: Identity and Self-Transformation in Women’s Lives 
108 (1995). 
 150. Id. at 231. 
 151. Robbie E. Davis-Floyd, Birth as an American Rite of Passage 61 (2003). 
 152. Friedman et al., supra note 66, at 796–99. 
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A. Locating and Defining Ritualization 
“Good motherhood” is derived from a cultural script telling women how 
to be mothers.
153
 This script requires women to relegate their sexuality to the 
periphery.
154
 Rituals bring women into the norms of pregnancy and 
motherhood.
155
 Women may be coerced into participating in what are typically 
treated in continuing pregnancies as bonding rituals associated with “good 
motherhood.”
156
 In the context of abortion, by requiring women to interact 
with providers multiple times or see an ultrasound, the law tries to compel 
them to accept the role of mother.
157
 Likewise, women are told by society and 
the legal system that to be a “good mother” they must participate in a 
medicalized birth and may be legally punished if they do not.
158
 
This Part examines how ritualization underpins the regulation of pregnant 
women’s sexual and reproductive health decisionmaking and thus undermines 
women’s autonomy once a woman is pregnant.
159
 Ritualization occurs both in 
the context of abortion and in the context of a continuing pregnancy, from 
prenatal care to childbirth. In both, we see examples of how Roe and its 
progeny have been mobilized to facilitate the State’s purported interest in 
“maternal” health and fetal life, which thinly veils how the law pushes women 
toward motherhood.
160
 
 
 153. McMahon, supra note 149, at 27. 
 154. Montemurro & Siefken, supra note 6, at 366; Tardy, supra note 6, at 462–63. 
 155. Lisa M. Mitchell, Baby’s First Picture: Ultrasound and the Politics of Fetal Subjects 174 (2001); 
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Legal Function of Ritual, 80 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1181, 1181, 1189–90 (2005) 
(“Rituals . . . speak to people’s core emotions and reveal values that a society holds dearest. Because their 
expression is conventional and obligatory, they join the individual in solidarity with the group. . . . Rituals are 
enacted at key transitions in a person’s life when he or she is likely to be receptive to influences on identity. 
These transitions include life crises such as . . . pregnancy, parenthood, or death of a loved one. People are 
likely to be more receptive to influence in these situations because the circumstances tend to be charged with 
emotion and because these are occasions where identities are changing.”). 
 156. See generally Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a 
Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 351, 382–83 (2008) [hereinafter Sanger, Seeing and Believing]. There are 
countless rituals in the medicalized birthing process today. Davis-Floyd, supra note 151, at 73–153 (listing, for 
example, the use of wheelchairs, separation from partners, use of hospital gowns instead of personal clothing, 
enemas, hospital beds, and fasting). 
 157. Sanger, Seeing and Believing, supra note 156, at 382–83. 
 158. The regulation of aspects of reproductive health is part of the “medicalized . . . need to protect 
women.” Ikemoto, The Realignment of Women’s Health, supra note 43, at 752; see infra Part II.B.; Valenti, 
supra note 25, at 158–61. The government extensively regulates the behavior of pregnant women when it 
comes to drug use. See, e.g., Julie B. Ehrlich, Breaking the Law by Giving Birth: The War on Drugs, the War 
on Reproductive Rights, and the War on Women, 32 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 381, 386–92 (2008) 
(examining state responses to “the perceived problem of drug use by pregnant women”). 
 159. Using abortion jurisprudence to directly or implicitly justify intervention in women’s reproductive 
lives is a “serious distortion” of Roe. Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: What’s Wrong with 
Fetal Rights, 10 Harv. Women’s L.J. 9, 15 (1987); see Kim Shayo Buchanan, Lawrence v. Geduldig: 
Regulating Women’s Sexuality, 56 Emory L.J. 1235, 1291 (2007) (“[T]he courts of appeals of two circuits 
have imported the ‘undue burden’ standard to adjudicate the equal protection rights of pregnant women in 
cases that have nothing to do with any countervailing state interest in protecting fetal life.”). 
 160. Roe is cited in reproductive and sexual health cases outside of the abortion context. See, e.g., Carey v. 
Population Control Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685–90 (1977); Leigh v. Bd. of Registration in Nursing, 506 
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The number and type of abortion-related laws are extensive and continue 
to increase.
161
 Some of these laws contain an insidious aspect: they replicate 
the rituals of prenatal care but with the goal of stopping women from 
exercising their right to have an abortion. Examples of common abortion laws 
that both limit access to abortion care and replicate prenatal care are forced 
ultrasounds, biased counseling, and mandatory delay laws, which operate 
together to ritualize abortion services. 
1. Forced Ultrasounds
162
 
Perhaps the most powerful ritual in a continuing pregnancy is displayed 
on a screen and subsequently carried in the pockets and purses of mothers-to-
be. This is the ultrasound, the first visual representation of a fetus.
163
 
Ultrasounds have become a rite of passage for a pregnant woman.
164
 This 
prenatal ritual is one of many legal tools that anti-reproductive-rights 
advocates use to push women seeking abortions toward motherhood.
165
 
Ultrasound use is virtually unregulated in the United States, and the 
research on the safety and efficacy for both the pregnant woman and fetus is 
limited.
166
 Even in a continuing pregnancy, ultrasounds are medically indicated 
only in limited circumstances.
167
 Ultrasounds in a continuing pregnancy can be 
used to confirm that the pregnancy is viable, determine the date of gestation 
and the number of fetuses, and to determine whether there may be problems 
with the fetus.
168
 During the ultrasound process, women may hear a fetal 
heartbeat and may leave their provider’s office with a printout of a bean-sized 
image to share with friends and family.
169
 Despite the popularity of this ritual, 
 
N.E.2d 91, 94 (Mass. 1987); Sammon v. N.J. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 66 F.3d 639, 646 (3d Cir. 1995); Lynn M. 
Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant Women in the United States, 1973–
2005: Implications for Women’s Legal Status and Public Health, 38 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 299, 325 (2013). 
 161. States Enact a Record Number of Abortion Restrictions in 2011, Guttmacher Inst. (Jan. 5, 2012), 
http://www.guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2012/01/05/endofyear.html. 
 162. Elective cesarean sections are beyond the scope of this Article. For points of view on this procedure, 
see Veronique Bergeron, The Ethics of Cesarean Section on Maternal Request: A Feminist Critique of the 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists’ Position on Patient-Choice Surgery, 21 Bioethics 478, 
482–84 (2007); Gene Declercq & Judy Norsigian, Mothers Aren’t Behind A Vogue for Caesareans, Boston 
Globe (Apr. 3, 2006), http://www.boston.com/yourlife/health/women/ 
articles/2006/04/03/mothers_arent_behind_a_vogue_for_caesareans. 
 163. Carol Sanger, “The Birth of Death”: Stillborn Birth Certificates and the Problem for Law, 100 Calif. 
L. Rev. 269, 282 (2012). 
 164. Id. at 282. 
 165. Sanger, supra note 163, at 301–02. 
 166. Compare, Ina May Gaskin, Ina May’s Guide to Childbirth 191 (2003), with Murkoff & Mazel supra 
note 139. 
 167. Gaskin, supra note 166, at 191. But see Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 
667 F.3d 570, 579 (5th Cir. 2012) (describing sonograms as “routine measures in pregnancy medicine today” 
and “‘medically necessary’ for the mother and fetus”). 
 168. Murkoff & Mazel, supra note 139, at 60; Gaskin, supra note 166, at 191. 
 169. Forming a Bond with Your Baby—Why It isn’t Always Immediate, WebMD (Aug. 2, 2012), 
http://www.webmd.com/parenting/baby/forming-a-bond-with-your-baby-why-it-isnt-always-immediate 
(“[Bonding] begins to happen even before the baby is bornwhen you feel the first little flutters in your belly 
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the ultrasound process and resulting “picture” are misleading; especially early 
in pregnancy, it is likely that “the ultrasound image has been magnified and the 
heartbeat amplified.”
170
 Studies show that most couples need help even 
interpreting the fetal image.
171
 So why is that black-and-white printout so 
powerful? Quite simply: the act of holding that picture defines the holder as a 
parent.
172
 
There are limited medical reasons to require an ultrasound for a first-
trimester abortion.
173
 Some providers perform ultrasounds voluntarily, 
however, while others are forced by law to either perform them or to give 
information about them prior to providing an abortion.
174
 Regardless of 
whether the ultrasound is mandated by law or performed at the direction of the 
provider, ultrasounds push women toward motherhood. 
 Some states do not require a provider to perform an ultrasound but 
require providers to offer to display the ultrasound screen if one is 
performed.
175
 In some states, the law forces a woman seeking an abortion to 
have an ultrasound—regardless of her or the provider’s wishes—and may 
require the provider to offer to show the image to the woman.
176
 State laws 
with the most “force” require providers to perform an ultrasound, display the 
image, and describe what is on the screen,
177
 presumably on the patriarchal 
assumption that women having an abortion have not thought their choice 
through.
178
 
Ultrasound laws are often veiled in medical terms and are described as a 
type of “informed consent.”
179
 Informed consent in medicine, generally, is 
 
or see your baby kick on the ultrasound screen.”); Kukla, supra note 25, at 70–74 (describing ultrasounds as 
being “social” events). 
 170. Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, Ala. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2014), at *45, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2258742. 
 171. Mitchell, supra note 155, at 5. 
 172. 10 Ways to Bond With Your Bump, Babycentre (last updated Oct. 2011), 
http://www.babycentre.co.uk/a1049630/10-ways-to-bond-with-your-bump#ixzz2GwTNBzGD (“Having a 
picture of your baby’s scan on your phone or on your fridge door is a constant reminder that your bump is 
home to a little person.”). 
 173. Sarah E. Weber, An Attempt to Legislate Morality: Forced Ultrasounds as the Newest Tactic in Anti-
Abortion Legislation, 45 Tulsa L. Rev. 359, 380 (2009); 2011 Clinical Policy Guidelines, Nat’l Abortion 
Fed’n, at 9–10 (2011), http://www.prochoice.org/pubs_research/publications/downloads/ 
professional_education/2011%20CPGs.pdf. 
 174. State Policies in Brief: Requirements for Ultrasound, Guttmacher Inst., 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2013). 
 175. See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2317.561 (West 2008); W. Va. Code § 16-2I-2(c) (2010). 
 176. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 26-23A-4(b)(4) (2002); Fla. Stat. § 390.0111(3)(a) (2013). 
 177. See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.35.2(D) (2012). In some circumstances, a woman may opt to 
look away or decline to listen. State Policies in Brief, supra note 174. 
 178. See, e.g., Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 573 (5th Cir. 
2012) (providing the title of the Texas anti-abortion and ultrasound statute—the “Woman’s Right to Know 
Act”). However, information that “might cause the woman to choose childbirth over abortion” does not in and 
of itself make a law unconstitutional. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992). 
 179. See, e.g., Tex. Med Providers Performing Abortion Servs., 667 F.3d at 582; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 40:1299.35.2(D)(2)(d) (requiring women to fill out a form indicating that they’ve been given the opportunity 
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designed to be a health protection for patients, but the use of ultrasounds and 
the required dialogue surrounding their use prior to abortion is intended to 
push women toward motherhood.
180
 Even if forced ultrasounds are 
constitutionally permissible, their purported constitutionality does not make 
them any more medically necessary or any less political.
181
 
Mandating ultrasounds in the context of abortion care uses a major ritual 
of a continuing pregnancy in an attempt to trigger “maternal” bonding, prompt 
“maternal” guilt, and prevent abortion.
182
 The very process of getting an 
ultrasound is part of the ritual of a continuing pregnancy: the cleaning of the 
stomach, the movement of the ultrasound wand, lying down on what may feel 
like a delivery table, lights dimmed and screen bright.
183
 It is in similar 
circumstances when, later in a continuing pregnancy, women may find out the 
sex of the baby and have the first glimpse of fetal body parts and the twists and 
turns of the fetus in utero. As such, the law tries to turn them into mothers; 
ultrasounds put the pregnant woman in a place very similar to where she might 
be in a much later point in pregnancy, one at which, hypothetically, she has 
accepted motherhood. It is a thinly “veiled attempt to personify the fetus and 
dissuade a woman from obtaining an abortion.”
184
 
2. Biased Counseling/Informed Consent and Mandatory 
Delay/Waiting Periods 
While the use of forced ultrasounds may be the most obvious way that a 
ritual of continuing pregnancy is used to push women seeking an abortion into 
motherhood, ritualization is used in other ways in the context of abortion. 
Although more subtle, some counseling and informed consent provisions 
regulating abortion also signify ritualization and further thrust women toward 
motherhood.
185
 
 
to see the “unborn child” and listen to a heartbeat); Sonia M. Suter, Bad Mothers or Struggling Mothers?, 42 
Rutgers L.J. 695, 700 (2011). 
 180. Suter, supra note 179, at 700. 
 181. Tex. Med Providers Performing Abortion Servs., 667 F.3d at 576. 
 182. Sanger, Seeing and Believing, supra note 156, at 382–83. 
 183. Mitchell, supra note 155, at 3; Michelle Chen, It’s Not Just Forced Ultrasound: Abortion Rights 
Under Assault, Salon (Oct. 21, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://www.salon.com/2012/10/21/ 
its_not_just_forced_ultrasound_abortion_rights_under_assault. Furthermore, given the high percentage of 
women having abortions who are already mothers, by replicating the ultrasound ritual, the law has compelled 
women to experience a significant ritual in “maternal” healthcare and “motherhood,” one which they may be 
familiar with as biological mothers. Lauren Sandler, The Mother Majority: Women with Children Have More 
Abortions than Anyone Else, and By an Increasingly Wide Margin. So Why is the Topic Taboo?, Slate 
(Oct. 17, 2011, 4:34 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2011/10/most_surprising_abortion_statistic_the_majority_of_
women_who_ter.html. 
 184. State Policies in Brief, supra note 174. 
 185. Chinué Turner Richardson & Elizabeth Nash, Misinformed Consent: The Medical Accuracy of State-
Developed Abortion Counseling Materials, 9 Guttmacher Pol’y Rev. 4 (2006) (“In some cases, the state goes so 
far as to include information that is patently inaccurate or incomplete, lending credence to the charge that states’ 
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The State may express anti-abortion viewpoints by forcing medical 
providers to convey information that goes beyond traditional informed consent 
requirements.
186 
Thirty-five states require that women receive some type of 
counseling prior to having an abortion; twenty-seven specify what the 
information must include, and that information is often biased or inaccurate.
187
 
These laws are often described as “informed consent” laws, a label that 
disingenuously implies that they replicate the counseling that takes place 
before all medical procedures when, in fact, the information provided goes far 
beyond that. This is why pro-choice advocates sometimes call them “biased 
counseling” laws.
188
 For example, South Dakota forces providers to give 
misleading information that says having an abortion puts women at increased 
risk of committing suicide.
189
 Wisconsin requires that the materials offered to a 
woman include “photographs, pictures or drawings, that are designed to inform 
the woman of the probable anatomical and physiological characteristics of the 
unborn child at 2-week gestational increments.”
190
 Some states even provide 
inaccurate information on the impact an abortion can have on future fertility
191
 
and the discredited theory that there is a link between abortion and breast 
cancer.
192
 
To understand how biased counseling constitutes ritualization at the time 
of an abortion, one must first understand how health care is delivered during a 
 
abortion counseling mandates are sometimes intended less to inform women about the abortion procedure than to 
discourage them from seeking abortions altogether.”). 
 186. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882–83 (1992) (“If the information the State 
requires to be made available to the woman is truthful and not misleading, the requirement may be 
permissible . . .[R]equiring that the woman be informed of the availability of information relating to fetal 
development and the assistance available should she decide to carry the pregnancy to full term is a reasonable 
measure to ensure an informed choice, one which might cause the woman to choose childbirth over abortion. 
This requirement cannot be considered a substantial obstacle to obtaining an abortion, and, it follows, there is 
no undue burden.”). 
 187. State Policies in Brief: Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, Guttmacher Inst., 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MWPA.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) [hereinafter 
Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion]. Counseling may be oral or written, in person or not. Id; see 
Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 939, 1000–
11 (2009) (arguing that women have a right to not listen to abortion-related counseling). 
 188. See Biased Counseling & Mandatory Delays, NARAL Pro-Choice Am., 
http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/what-is-choice/fast-facts/biased_counseling.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2013) 
(defining “biased counseling” and “mandatory delay”); see also Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, 
supra note 187; Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling Laws Mandate 
Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 Mich. J. Gender & L. 1, 6–33 (2012). 
 189. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., & S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 905 (8th Cir. 2012); Spurious 
Science Triumphs as U.S. Court Upholds South Dakota “Suicide Advisory” Law, Guttmacher Inst. (July 27, 
2012), http://www.guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2012/07/27/index.html (quoting the American 
Psychological Association as saying, “the best scientific evidence indicates that the relative risk of mental 
health problems among adult women who have an unplanned pregnancy is no greater if they have an elective 
first-trimester abortion than if they deliver the pregnancy”). 
 190. Wis. Stat. § 253.10 (3)(d)(2) (2012). 
 191. Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 187 (listing Arizona, Kansas, North 
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and West Virginia). 
 192. Id. (listing Alaska, Kansas, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Texas). 
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typical pregnancy. In an ideal prenatal care setting, when a woman chooses to 
continue a pregnancy, her interaction with a medical professional begins 
immediately. In addition to confirming the pregnancy, the first visit typically 
involves the taking of a medical history, a physical exam, some laboratory 
tests, a lot of talk about what is to come in the next several months, and ways 
for the pregnant woman to stay healthy during the pregnancy.
193
 
Biased counseling laws are an attempt to replicate that prominent ritual of 
pregnancy: visits to a trusted healthcare provider.
194
 But abortion “informed 
consent” statutes do nothing of the kind; they twist the woman’s medical 
confidant into an ideological advocate, whether or not the provider agrees.
195
 
As a consequence, a woman’s trust in her provider is used against her. 
Admittedly, when a pregnancy is to be terminated, a woman’s 
relationship with the provider is more truncated than the relationships women 
have with their providers in an ongoing pregnancy.
196
 Nonetheless, by 
requiring biased counseling, the State pushes healthcare providers to exert 
power over a woman seeking to end a pregnancy. The power a practitioner has 
over a pregnant woman, whether she is ending or continuing her pregnancy, is 
immense
197
 and is badly misused when counseling is biased, especially when 
that provider is forced to provide erroneous health information.
198
 But biased 
counseling is not the only example of ritualization in pregnancy. Mandatory 
delay laws, which require time to pass between an initial consultation and the 
abortion, also mimic the care provided in a wanted pregnancy. 
Monthly visits to a medical provider are one of the rituals of an ongoing 
pregnancy.
199
 The wait between each visit provides time for the pregnant 
woman (transformed into a mother) to bond with the fetus and to contemplate 
motherhood.
200
 This process is mirrored to a limited extent by laws that 
mandate delay between a woman’s decision to have an abortion and the 
procedure itself. In twenty-six states, a woman has to wait one or more days 
between the time she seeks an abortion and the time an abortion is performed, 
 
 193. Murkoff & Mazel, supra note 139, at 124–26. 
 194. Compare id. at 21–32, with La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.35.6(A)(4)(c) (2012). 
 195. Richardson & Nash, supra note 185. 
 196. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.35.6(A)(4)(c) (“The vast majority of all abortions are performed in 
clinics devoted solely to providing abortions and family planning services. Most women who seek abortions at 
these facilities do not have any relationship with the physician who performs the abortion, before or after the 
procedure. They do not return to the facility for postsurgical care. In most instances, the woman’s only actual 
contact with the physician occurs simultaneously with the abortion procedure, with little opportunity to receive 
counseling concerning her decision.”). 
 197. See, e.g., M.C. Shapiro et al., Information Control and the Exercise of Power in the Obstetrical 
Encounter, 17 Soc. Sci. Med. 139, 145 (1983). 
 198. Vandewalker, supra note 188, at 6–33. 
 199. See generally Murkoff & Mazel, supra note 139 (describing monthly prenatal visits). 
 200. Id. at 29, 248; Sara Terzo, Analysis: Pro-Life Support for Abortion Waiting Periods and Informed 
Consent Saves Lives, Live Action News (Jan. 20, 2013), http://liveactionnews.org/pro-life-support-for-
abortion-waiting-periods-and-informed-consent-saves-lives. 
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and several states mandate two visits to the abortion provider.
201
 A woman 
terminating a pregnancy is required to take the time to think about and bond 
with her “unborn child,” as if she had not already seriously considered her 
decision to have an abortion before going to visit her provider. 
Forced ultrasounds, biased counseling, and mandatory delay laws 
replicate rituals that take place during the process preceding childbirth for the 
purpose of making women accept the role of mother, and thus impede 
women’s access to abortion. The information presented to the woman—via 
ultrasound, orally, or in writing—is designed to create a hierarchical 
relationship with a medical professional who then may be required to provide 
information designed to induce women to feel like a mother through these 
rituals and create feelings of guilt about choosing not to be a mother. If a 
woman does not change her mind, she is rejecting “a five-thousand-year-old 
tide of conditioning, of social agendas propounded by churches and other 
male-dominated institutions, that say that a woman’s primary purpose is to 
have children and to serve her children and her husband.”
202
 
B. The Patient Mother 
One might think that once a woman accepts the responsibility of 
childbirth, the State would cease to intervene. But “choice” is not just about 
abortion. Pregnancy and the birth process are filled with a vast number of 
options regarding how birth will take place.
203
 And the law frequently 
influences what choices women make as mothers, as we see through the 
ritualized practices in the ongoing pregnancy. 
In the context of childbirth, ritualization involves a woman engaging the 
rituals of a medicalized pregnancy and birth process, primarily the rituals 
involved in standard obstetric care and hospital birthing.
204
 
By ‘medicalizing’ birth, i.e. separating a woman from her own environment 
and surrounding her with strange people using strange machines to do 
strange things to her in an effort to assist her, the woman’s state of mind and 
body is so altered that her way of carrying through this intimate act must also 
be altered and the state of the baby born must equally be altered. The result 
is that it is no longer possible to know what births would have been like 
before these manipulations. Most health care providers no longer know what 
 
 201. Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 187. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 885–87 (1992) (upholding a twenty-four hour waiting period). Although some states 
require a mandatory delay of less than twenty-four hours, the practical impact of the delay is likely to make the 
woman have to return to the provider the following day. 
 202. Christiane Northrup, Women’s Bodies, Women’s Wisdom: Creating Physical and Emotional Health 
and Healing 388 (2010). 
 203. Murkoff & Mazel, supra note 139, at 21–31. 
 204. This Article asserts that ritualization is reflected in the broader trend of medicalization, the “process 
of turning . . . people into patients. . . . It leads people to have too much treatmentand some of them are 
harmed by it.” H. Gilbert Welch, Opinion, The Medicalization of Life, L.A. Times (Mar. 15, 2010), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/15/opinion/la-oe-welch15-2010mar15. 
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‘non-medicalized’ birth is. The entire modern obstetric and neonatological 
literature is essentially based on observations of ‘medicalized’ birth.
205
 
Although women can give birth in a variety of settings, they do so 
overwhelmingly in hospitals and with physicians, though options for other 
birth attendants exist.
206
 In the United States there is a “veritable mandate” that 
babies be born in hospitals—and nearly all are.
207
 This is due, in part, to the 
increasing number of medical technologies that are presented as necessary for 
a safe labor process: fetal monitors and intravenous medicines, among other 
interventions, are part of the birth ritual.
208
 Given all of the technology now 
available for use during the labor process, its use is expected; women who 
refuse modern locations, modern interventions, or who forsake “scientific” 
(that is physician) advice risk being seen as selfish, the hallmark of a “bad 
mother.”
209
 
Some degree of medicalization within the narrow relationship between a 
pregnant woman and her practitioner is expected. But our legal regime may go 
above and beyond the typical provider-patient relationship by dictating where, 
how, and with whom women may labor.
210
 Why do we see ritualization in the 
law and social dictates regarding what constitutes a good pregnancy and 
birth?
211
 Is it a symptom of industrialization and our societal obsession with 
new technologies?
212
 Is it a sign not only of State intervention but also our 
lawsuit-happy society, with doctors choosing to intervene rather than assume 
legal risk?
213
 Or might the State’s push to use the rituals of medicalized birth 
reflect a distrust of women’s reproductive capacity, a view “of the female body 
as an inherently defective machine?”
214
 The answer is unknown. 
 
 205. M. Wagner, Fish Can’t See Water: The Need to Humanize Birth, 75 Int’l J. Gynecology & Obstetrics 
S25, S26 (2001) (quoting the European Reg’l Office, World Health Org., Having a Baby in Europe (1985)). 
 206. Joyce A. Martin et al., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Births: Final Data for 2011, 62 Nat’l Vital 
Statistics Reports 1, 12 (2013). 
 207. Heather Joy Baker, “We Don’t Want to Scare the Ladies:” An Investigation of Maternal Rights and 
Informed Consent Throughout the Birth Process, 31 Women’s Rights L. Rep. 538, 553 (2010); see supra note 
206. 
 208. Murkoff & Mazel, supra note 139, at 362–99. 
 209. See Kukla, supra note 25, at 74 (discussing “birth as a maternal achievement test”); Baker, supra note 
207, at 553. See generally Susan Goldberg, Medical Choices During Pregnancy: Whose Decision is it Anyway?, 
41 Rutgers L. Rev. 591 (1989) (discussing efforts to compel pregnant women to undergo treatments against their 
wishes). Blaming the woman for all ills that befall her baby is not new; for example, people used to believe that “if 
you looked at ugly things, you’d have an ugly baby.” Tara Parker-Pope, Lessons from the History of Childbirth, 
N.Y. Times (Well) (Feb. 5, 2010, 10:28 AM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/05/the-history-of-childbirth. 
For a discussion of the “bad mother” in law, see generally Marie Ashe, The “Bad Mother” In Law and Literature: 
A Problem of Representation, 43 Hastings L.J. 1017 (1992). 
 210. The tort system may impact obstetrical practice. Sheila Kitzinger, The Complete Book of Pregnancy 
& Childbirth 56 (2011); Davis-Floyd, supra note 151, at 48. 
 211. Jennifer Block, Pushed: The Painful Truth About Childbirth and Modern Maternity Care 6 (2007); 
Davis-Floyd, supra note 151, at 48. 
 212. Block, supra note 211, at 6, 39–40. 
 213. Id. at 43; Davis-Floyd, supra note 151, at 48. 
 214. Davis-Floyd, supra note 151, at 72. 
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The State controls pregnancy and labor by propelling pregnant women 
toward a birth marked by a standard set of medical rituals. Specifically, it 
adopts laws and allows legal interventions that (1) limit what type of medical 
professional can attend childbirth, (2) limit the locations of birth labor, and 
(3) limit the methods women use to give birth. All of these exemplify how 
women are expected to participate in the ritualization of pregnancy, the 
propulsion of those women toward “good motherhood,” and the consequences 
to women who do not participate in these rituals.
215
 
1. Attending Birth 
Among the most important decisions a woman approaching childbirth can 
make is the choice of who, if anyone, will provide medical attention to her and 
the child at birth. This choice is circumscribed by legal restrictions limiting the 
number of acceptable choices available to a “good mother.” 
In medicalized birth the doctor is always in control while the key element in 
humanized birth is the woman in control of her own birthing and whatever 
happens to her. No patient has ever been in complete control in the 
hospital—if a patient disagrees with the hospital management and has failed 
in attempts to negotiate the care, her only option is to sign herself out of the 
hospital. Giving women choice about certain maternity care procedures is 
not giving up control since doctors [decide] what choices women will be 
given and doctors still have the power to decide whether or not they will 
acquiesce to a woman’s choice.
216
 
More than eighty-six percent of all hospital births are attended by 
physicians, who are often criticized as being proponents of medicalized 
birth.
217
 A recent trend in birth choice in the United States is to eschew the 
services of a physician and use alternative providers—midwives—to facilitate 
a kinder, more gentle birth.
218
 There are several types of midwives, and each 
has different legal status, degree of legal regulation, educational requirements, 
and type of organization.
219
 Even though many Certified Nurse Midwives, one 
type of midwife, practice in hospitals,
220
 they are seen by some as a viable 
alternative to the medicalization of birth.
221
 Still, many fewer hospital births 
are attended by midwives as compared with physicians,
222
 even though studies 
 
 215. The treatment of pregnant women may vary depending upon the pregnant woman’s social status. 
Michele Goodwin, Prosecuting the Womb, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1657, 1661–64 (2008) (outlining the 
discriminatory application of drug-related laws to pregnant women). 
 216. Wagner, supra note 205, at S26. 
 217. Martin et al., supra note 206, at 12; Block, supra note 211, at 263. 
 218. This is not to say that all physicians subscribe to a medicalized view of birth, or that all midwives do 
not. Gaskin, supra note 166, at 305–07. 
 219. For detailed information on the types of midwives, see Comparison of Certified Nurse-Midwives, 
Certified Midwives, and Certified Professional Midwives, Am. Coll. of Nurse-Midwives (Mar. 2011). 
 220. Martin et al., supra note 206, at 12–13. 
 221. Murkoff & Mazel, supra note 139, at 24–25; Gaskin, supra note 166, at 305–07; Rebecca A. Spence, 
Abandoning Women to Their Rights: What Happens When Feminist Jurisprudence Ignores Birthing Rights, 19 
Cardozo. J.L. & Gender 75, 93 (2012). 
 222. Martin et al., supra note 206, at 12. 
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suggest that births attended by midwives (as well as births at home) are as safe 
as or safer than physician-assisted births for women with uncomplicated 
pregnancies.
223
 But midwives face a patchwork of legal regulations.
224
 
In midwifery-related jurisprudence, Roe has been used by courts as both 
sword and shield against pregnant women. For example, one court wrote that 
Roe and its progeny provide no privacy protection for women wanting 
midwives, thus limiting access to such providers: “The right to privacy which 
protects a woman’s choice to have an abortion has never been interpreted to 
guarantee a woman the right to choose the manner and circumstances in which 
her baby is born.”
225
 Another court used Roe to find a legitimate state interest 
in regulating midwifery and limiting access to midwives.
226
 Thus, once the 
woman has had sex that leads to procreation, ritualization of birth seals the 
deal: as a mother-to-be she is desexualized and pregnancy and birth rituals 
further entrench her in her socially and legally defined role as a mother. 
As discussed previously, Roe’s applicability to women’s health issues 
outside of the abortion context—including midwifery—is questionable. This 
is, in part, because it is unclear what parts of Roe are essential holdings and 
what parts are dicta.
227
 Roe states that it is permissible to regulate the 
qualifications of the abortion provider, the location of the procedure, and the 
applicable licensing requirements, but this approval is given in the context of 
abortion services, and it does not speak to any extension of the holding outside 
of that factual context.
228
 Nonetheless, some in the midwifery community 
appear to concede that an expansive reading of Roe supports arguments to 
curtail or regulate midwifery.
229
 
 
 223. Christopher Rausch, The Midwife and the Forceps: The Wild Terrain of Midwifery Law in the United 
States and Where North Dakota is Heading in the Birthing Debate, 84 N.D. L. Rev. 219, 227–30 (2008). 
 224. For detailed information, see Comparison of Certified Nurse-Midwives, Certified Midwives, and 
Certified Professional Midwives, supra note 219. Additionally, midwives may have difficulty with insurance 
reimbursement, finding physicians willing to supervise their practice, or getting hospital privileges. Susan 
Corcoran, To Become a Midwife: Reducing Legal Barriers to Entry into the Midwifery Profession, 80 Wash. 
U. L.Q. 649, 651 (2002). 
 225. Leigh v. Bd. of Registration in Nursing, 506 N.E.2d 91, 94 (Mass. 1987). 
 226. Sammon v. N.J. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 66 F.3d 639, 646 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 227. See Randy Beck, Self-Conscious Dicta: The Origins of Roe v. Wade’s Trimester Framework, 51 Am. 
J. Legal History 505, 506–08 (2011). 
 228. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). 
 229. One person in the midwifery community said that “[i]n short, if a state can require persons 
performing abortions to be licensed doctors, then a state can require that persons assisting births be licensed 
doctors, nurses or midwives as well. This is why midwifery proponents should never argue that Roe v. Wade 
supports a mother’s right to choose her manner and place of giving birth. . . . Because midwifery involves the 
birth of a child after viability, assisted by a nonphysician, Roe v. Wade is not good precedent for a privacy 
argument.” Erik L. Smith, Midwifery and the Constitution, 65 Midwifery Today 33, 35 (2003). For an 
examination of Roe’s impact in other non-abortion contexts, see generally Susan Behuniak-Long, Roe v. 
Wade: The Impact of An Outdated Decision on Reproductive Technologies, 8 Pol’y Studies Rev. 368 (1989). 
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Restrictions on midwifery are based on the ritualized treatment of labor as 
a medical condition.
230
 As in abortion jurisprudence, even before birth, women 
are treated as mothers whose first priority is their baby, not as women who can 
make autonomous healthcare decisions.
231
 Legal barriers to midwifery have the 
attendant consequence of driving women into the traditional healthcare system, 
where technology is omnipresent and where “good mothers” take advantage of 
it.
232
 These medicalized rituals are a welcome aspect of birth for some women, 
yet for those who seek an alternative path to childbirth, even one that has been 
shown to be safe for mother and fetus, rejection of prescribed rituals opens the 
door to further legal limits on reproductive autonomy, such as where the birth 
can take place and what type of birth—vaginal or cesarean—will occur. 
2. Locating Birth 
The location of birth is closely linked to who attends birth.
233
 Again, the 
location of birth triggers the State’s interest in “maternal” health as 
conceptualized in abortion regulation and, thus, ritualization is present. And 
again, this regulation of “motherhood” takes place before a woman actually 
becomes a mother. 
Although nearly one hundred percent of births took place in a hospital in 
2011,
234
 not all women want hospital births; some women seek to give birth at 
a birthing center or even at home. Birthing centers are typically locations 
where women are often attended by midwives in a setting that is less 
medicalized than hospitals.
235
 Home birth is controversial; a 2012 study goes 
as far as to propose that countries should establish home birth support, as 
“there is no strong evidence . . . to favour either planned hospital birth or 
planned home birth for low-risk pregnant women.”
236
 But the legal 
ramifications of giving birth at home can be dramatic for both the pregnant 
woman and any medical professional who may help her.
237
 
 
 230. Marsden Wagner, Born in the USA: How a Broken Maternity System Must Be Fixed to Put Mothers 
and Infants First 108 (2006); Laura D. Hermer, Midwifery: Strategies on the Road to Universal Legalization, 
13 Health Matrix 325, 330–32, 367 (2003). 
 231. Lynn M. Paltrow, Missed Opportunities in McCorvey v. Hill: The Limits of Pro-Choice Lawyering, 
35 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 194, 221–22 (2011) (discussing the lack of concern in the law for the regret 
and emotion women feel when their labor and birth choices are not respected). 
 232. Kiki Zeldes & Judy Norsigian, Encouraging Women to Consider a Less Medicalized Approach to 
Childbirth Without Turning Them Off: Challenges to Producing Our Bodies, Ourselves: Pregnancy and Birth, 
35 Birth 245, 249 (2008). 
 233. See Spence, supra note 221, at 92–93 (“Reproductive justice demands that all pregnant people have 
an equal opportunity to make and exercise decisions about their care, including out-of-hospital birth. While no 
state regulates the location where a woman must give birth, all states have the power to license and regulate 
health professionals who attend birth as a component of state police power.”).  
 234. Martin et al., supra note 206, at 12. 
 235. Murkoff & Mazel, supra note 139, at 23. 
 236. Ole Olsen & Jette A. Clausen, Planned Hospital Birth Versus Planned Home Birth (Review), 
Cochrane Library, Sept. 2012, at 1, 15. 
 237. Anna Hickman, Born (Not So) Free: Legal Limits on the Practice of Unassisted Childbirth or 
Freebirthing in the United States, 94 Minn L. Rev. 1651, 1653–54 (2010); NFOM Frequently Asked 
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Birth outside of hospitals is constrained.
238
 For example, there is a 
significant economic barrier for women wanting home birth; even 
professionals who can attend such births legally are often not covered by 
private insurance, forcing the costs onto the pregnant woman.
239
 Moreover, 
women can be prosecuted for their birth choice, the ultimate retribution for 
rejecting the traditional ritualization of birth, and some of these cases cite Roe 
in their analyses of women’s reproductive rights in the context of home 
birth.
240
 Whether one agrees with the pregnant woman’s decision or not, at a 
minimum, the very existence of criminal prosecution may have a chilling 
effect on this form of non-medicalized childbirth, limiting a woman’s choices. 
This may have the consequence of solidifying the ritual of the hospital birth. 
The regulation of midwives and birth locations goes much further than 
the women’s health regulation contemplated in Roe: by the point of labor, the 
woman has already accepted her maternal role and the inevitability of birth is 
no longer a concern. Still, the State influences pregnant women’s choices 
regarding how a pregnancy should progress and thus dictates whether a 
pregnant woman is acting as a “good mother” when she makes those 
choices.
241
 
The relationship between laws related to midwifery, home birth, and labor 
regulates women’s birth choices and serves to promote a certain ritualized 
form of childbirth, regardless of a woman’s choices: a medicalized birth. At 
the point of birth, women are heavily invested in the management of their own 
birth process, hence the emergence of so-called birth plans in which women 
express in writing their desires regarding how, where, and with whom 
childbirth is to proceed, the ultimate expression of reproductive 
management.
242
 Yet despite these private documents, purported State interests 
may trump a woman’s desires. When the regulations concerning where and 
with whom birth may occur are read together, it appears that the State is 
invested in the ritualization of a medicalized birth, just as it was invested in a 
 
Questions, Neb. Friends of Midwives, http://nefriendsofmidwives.weebly.com/ faqs.html#abouthomebirth (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2013) (stating that Nebraska Certified Nurse Midwives who attend a home birth purposefully 
may be guilty of a felony).  
 238. Regulations governing licensure impact women’s ability to labor at home. Home-Birth Advocates 
Push for Change in Laws, NBC News (Jan. 28, 2009), http://www.nbcnews.com/ id/28901624/ns/health-
womens_health/t/home-birth-advocates-push-change-laws/#.T6vcSK75878; Hickman, supra note 237, at 
1658; Stacey A. Tovino, American Midwifery Litigation and State Legislative Preferences for Physician-
Controlled Childbirth, 11 Cardozo Women’s L.J. 61, 70 (2004). For example, many nurse-midwives must be 
supervised by physicians, who often will not supervise home births for liability reasons. 
 239. Home-Birth Advocates Push for Change in Laws, supra note 238. 
 240. Commonwealth v. Pugh, 969 N.E.2d 672, 676 (Mass. 2012) (reversing conviction of woman for 
involuntary manslaughter, discussing “whether a woman in the midst of unassisted [home] childbirth may be 
held criminally responsible for . . . ‘inflicting fatal injuries on a viable and near full term fetus during the 
birthing process’”); United States v. Jumper, 3 Fed App’x 141, 147 (4th Cir. 2001) (saying, in the context of 
an involuntary manslaughter conviction, “[t]he evidence fairly supports the inference that Jumper knew that 
the health and life of her child were endangered by her decision to give birth at home without any aid”). 
 241. Paltrow, supra note 16. 
 242. Murkoff & Mazel, supra note 139, at 294–97. 
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ritualized abortion process. But ritualization goes further—all the way to labor 
and delivery, which, if medical orders are not followed, may result in court-
ordered medical intervention. 
3. Accomplishing Birth 
In some circumstances, labor does not culminate in vaginal birth; rather, a 
baby may be born by cesarean section, a procedure by which the baby is 
removed from the woman via an incision into her uterus.
243
 Once uncommon, 
the percentage of cesareans in the United States was almost thirty-three percent 
in 2011,
244
 more than double the estimated maximum safe percentage of 
cesarean births set by the World Health Organization and United States health 
agencies; many cesarean sections, therefore, are likely unnecessary.
245
 
Cesarean sections are not without risk: many minor complications, such as 
infection, are possible and, most significantly, cesarean birth presents higher 
maternal death rates than vaginal delivery.
246
 
Cesarean sections are becoming a cornerstone of ritualized birth: not 
having one can exemplify bad “motherhood.”  
As long as she has formally consented to Cesarean surgery, the case is 
assumed to be an easy one: her decision should be effectuated. When she has 
refused, however, the question becomes whether the state can override that 
choice. Conventional legal analyses thus pose questions such as: 1) Does the 
right to decide whether to procreate necessarily imply a right to decide how 
to procreate?; 2) Does the state’s interest in the life and health of a full-term 
fetus outweigh the woman’s right to refuse medical treatment?; 3) Does the 
duty of a parent to rescue a child in danger extend to a mother carrying a 
full-term fetus? Does it apply even when the rescue involves a risk of death 
to the mother?
247
 
Discussing what type of birth constitutes ritualization is complex. 
Certainly the high rate of cesarean sections suggests that, increasingly, the 
correct ritual in terms of medicalization and being a “good mother” may be a 
cesarean section in some circumstances. Legal decisions have made clear that 
in some cases, the State thinks “mother” does not know best when it comes to 
birth choice. In the context of abortion, for example, the Casey Court says, 
“[n]or can it be doubted that most women considering an abortion would deem 
the impact on the fetus relevant, if not dispositive, to the decision.”
248
 Imagine, 
then, any court’s reaction to a mother-to-be deciding against having a cesarean 
section when told to have one by a medical professional. 
 
 243. Our Bodies, Ourselves, supra note 102, at 424–27. 
 244. Martin et al., supra note 206, at 13. 
 245. Denise Grady, Caesarean Births Are at a High in the U.S., N.Y. Times (Mar. 23, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/health/24birth.html. 
 246. Gaskin, supra note 166, at 288–89. 
 247. Ehrenreich, supra note 37, at 497. 
 248. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992). 
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In several cases, laboring or critically ill women have been forced to have 
a cesarean section by court order. In one example, a pregnant woman was 
forcibly restrained and drugged under the watch of a horrified partner when 
she refused a cesarean section in favor of a vaginal delivery.
249
 Other women 
have gone into hiding to avoid State-compelled cesarean sections,
250
 and 
refusal to have a cesarean, even when the child is subsequently born healthy, 
has been considered in abuse and neglect proceedings.
251
 
In compelled cesarean section cases, the law that is supposed to protect 
women’s reproductive choices, at least in the context of abortion, Roe, may 
actually be used against women when they choose a birth strategy that is 
contrary to the provider’s suggestions.
252
 Again, on its surface, Roe’s 
simultaneous interest in “maternal” health and fetal life may seem applicable in 
situations where a court forces a woman to have a cesarean section—especially 
given the proximity of the woman to motherhood. Seemingly, if a woman 
aborting a fetus is “maternal” in Roe, so too would be a woman approaching 
birth. However, courts forcing women to have cesarean sections use Roe to 
amplify the woman’s function as mother and the necessity of State intervention 
because of her failure to assume a maternal role for the benefit of the fetus.
253
 
Whether sex was initially for pleasure or procreation, once pregnant, the 
woman is viewed as a mother and is expected to participate in the rituals 
surrounding that role accordingly. That is what a “good mother” does. 
The expanded use of cesarean sections exemplifies shifts in how society 
sees childbirth, shifts that can “evolve into normalized practices, not only 
normalizing the obstetrical interventions but also their underlying assumptions 
about women’s emotional and physiological insufficiency in labor and 
delivery.”
254
 So, in the context of forced cesarean sections, the law may not 
only reflect judgments of the labor-related decisions women make, but also the 
physical capacity of women to labor without paternalistic direction from the 
State. 
IV.  The Future of Women’s Health Regulation? 
Desexualization and ritualization have served both as signals and, 
arguably, tools of State intervention in women’s health, but how might 
 
 249. See, e.g., Marguerite A. Driessen, Avoiding the Melissa Rowland Dilemma: Why Disobeying a 
Doctor Should Not Be A Crime, 10 Mich. St. U. J. Med. & L. 1, 35–37 (2006) (describing the compelled 
cesarean section of a Nigerian woman, whose husband later killed himself). 
 250. Charity Scott, Resisting The Temptation to Turn Medical Recommendations into Judicial Orders: A 
Reconsideration of Court-Ordered Surgery for Pregnant Women, 10 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 615, 674 (1994). 
 251. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. V.M., 974 A.2d 448, 449–52 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009). 
 252. Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 160, at 325. 
 253. Id. Another argument is that the State interest in maternal health is so strong that it overwhelms the 
woman’s interest in autonomy. This, however, is not borne out in case law, which focuses on fetal health. See 
generally Burkstrand-Reid, The Invisible Woman, supra note 51 (discussing the minimization of the health 
risks of cesarean sections). 
 254. Bergeron, supra note 162, at 486. 
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desexualization and ritualization be used in the future? To an extent, these 
concepts rely on one another to function. While desexualization is the means 
by which sex is defined as solely procreative, ritualization further redefines the 
woman who took part in sex as a mother by treating her as one, regardless of 
whether she intends to carry the pregnancy to term. A woman’s choice to have 
sex for pleasure can be devalued via desexualization, and that disapproval may 
be reinforced via ritualization or a woman can be subjected to ritualization as a 
means of devaluing her sexual choices. 
Reproductive health choices in the areas of contraception, abortion, 
pregnancy, and birth suggest that accepting even a constructive State interest in 
women’s reproductive health may come with a cost: the loss of autonomy 
concerning personal health decisionmaking. That cost may increase as State 
intervention increases. For example, given the State’s ostensible efforts to 
“protect” maternal health at present, might the next step be to protect potential 
maternal health and to intervene more aggressively in women’s sexual choices 
earlier in or prior to pregnancy?
255
 If so, desexualization and ritualization in 
reproductive health law may boost any effort to “protect” women’s health, 
which emphasizes why protections should be carefully scrutinized. 
Nonetheless, women need the law to recognize the inherent importance of 
women’s health but must also deal with the negative consequences of what that 
recognition can mean for their autonomy.
256
 
A. Desexualization and Ritualization Going Forward 
Whether desexualization and ritualization are tools affirmatively used to 
manufacture mothers or to simply serve as signals that state involvement in 
women’s health is present, they raise an important question: to what extent do 
we want the State to be involved in regulating, or protecting, women’s health 
generally and women’s reproductive health specifically? Two examples of the 
potential application of desexualization and ritualization, one in the context of 
contraception regulation and a second in the context of abortion legislation, 
show that the answer to this question is not obvious. 
Contraception is one example of an area of reproductive health regulation 
in which we may see more desexualization and ritualization. As previously 
discussed, current controversies surrounding contraceptive coverage and 
emergency contraceptives show that expanding the availability of 
contraceptives is a political landmine. For example, future legislation might 
seek to force women to read and sign a state-authored “informed consent” 
 
 255. Although not discussed in this Article, conceptualizing women’s health as maternal health may also 
impact women’s rights in relation to assisted reproductive technology. See generally Burkstrand-Reid, The 
More Things Change, supra note 68; Jack M. Balkin, How New Genetic Technologies Will Transform Roe v. 
Wade, 56 Emory L.J. 843 (2007). 
 256. See infra Part IV.B. 
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document akin to those used in the context of abortion
257
 at the time they 
receive contraceptives—emergency or otherwise. Documentation could appear 
on a receipt or even the electronic keypad when you swipe your card at 
checkout.
258
 Such a regulation would be yet another way to desexualize 
women who have sex for pleasure by putting them through a ritual of 
motherhood in the form of a pseudo-medical “consultation” via the reading of 
state-authorized “medical” information. Moreover, such a law would mirror 
ones already approved by courts in the context of abortion.
259
 But dismissing 
the utility of such a regulation out of hand may ignore a hypothetical benefit. 
Certainly adding an informed consent requirement could, if the information 
was accurate and apolitical, protect women’s health to some limited extent by 
informing women as to the safety and efficacy of the medication.
260
 However, 
the implication of forcing a woman to read such “informed consent”-type 
information is that a woman would not otherwise read about the medication or 
consider the risks inherent in taking such medication. 
As the contraception hypothetical shows, legal intervention in women’s 
health has costs, such as the loss of autonomy, and potential benefits, such as 
the provision of medical knowledge, if executed apolitically. Thus, 
desexualization and ritualization may not necessarily be harmful in every 
context. At a minimum, however, their presence should counsel further 
consideration of how a law with them operates. 
The presence of both the benefits and detriments of desexualization and 
ritualization are also seen in the context of abortion. Prior to Gonzales, 
reproductive rights jurisprudence mandated exceptions to abortion restrictions 
when a pregnant woman’s life or health was in danger, but the status of the 
health requirement is now uncertain.
261
 Since Gonzales, activists have decried 
the shrinking of so-called “health exceptions” in abortion law.
262
 Efforts to 
reinvigorate them, however, may come with both benefits and costs. 
 
 257. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 31-9A-3 to -4 (2013); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 41-41-33, -35 (2013); Kan. 
Stat. Ann. § 65-6709 (2013); see also supra note 187. 
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2013, at A11. 
 259. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 260. Our Bodies, Ourselves, supra note 102, at 226 (saying that birth control pills increase the risk of 
blood clots, and outlining which women should not use the pill); see Plan B One-Step Product Leaflet, What 
You Need to Know (package insert listing possible side effects including changes in menstruation, abdominal 
pain, and nausea). Emergency contraceptives in particular are safe under most circumstances. Id. at 251–53 
(noting that some medications may interfere with some emergency contraceptives). 
 261. B. Jessie Hill, A Radically Immodest Judicial Modesty: The End of Facial Challenges to Abortion 
Regulations and the Future of the Health Exception in the Roberts Era, 59 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 997, 1018–19 
(2009) (noting that the decisions in Ayotte and Gonzales “effectively re-opened the issue of the meaning and 
scope of the health exception requirement”). 
 262. See, e.g., Abortion Bans Without Exceptions Endanger Women’s Health, NARAL Pro-Choice Am. 
(Jan. 1, 2012), http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/fact-sheets/abortion-bans-no-exceptions-endanger-
women.pdf. 
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Recently, controversy has arisen over abortion bans passed under the 
guise of preventing “fetal pain” during an abortion procedure: these laws are 
often called “Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection” acts.
263
 Fetal pain bans 
dramatically restrict abortion at and after the twentieth week post-fertilization 
and contain extremely circumscribed exceptions for women’s health;
264
 this 
effort “indefensibly jeopardizes” women’s health, according the American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the American Congress of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists.
265
 Courts have struck down some fetal pain-
based bans, but they remain in effect in several states.
266
 
Desexualization and ritualization are present in fetal-pain-based abortion 
bans. Women are turned into mothers by virtue of the fact that they are 
pregnant (ostensibly proving that sex was for procreation), they have carried 
the pregnancy for a long period of time, and, when they want to terminate the 
pregnancy, they are expected to subrogate their own health needs for the needs 
of the fetus.
267
 
Fetal-pain-based bans are a prime example of the law’s eroding protection 
of women’s health.
268
 The American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists and the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
decried one fetal pain based-ban as “fail[ing] entirely to protect women for 
whom pregnancy poses serious health risks.”
269
 Certainly, the lack of adequate 
health exceptions in these laws has been a call-to-arms for pro-choice 
 
 263. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 26-23B-1 (2013); Idaho Code Ann. § 18-501 (2013); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 40:1299.30.1 (2013); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-3,106 (2013); Okla. Stat. tit. 63 § 1-745.1 (2013). For an example 
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recoiling.”); see State Policies on Later Abortions, Guttmacher Inst. (Aug. 1, 2013), 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_PLTA.pdf (listing twenty-week bans and fetal pain-based 
bans, and defining fetal pain bans as “based on the assertion that the fetus can feel pain at 18 or 20 weeks 
postfertilization”). 
 264. Twenty weeks post-fertilization is the equivalent of twenty-two weeks after the woman’s last 
menstrual period. State Policies on Later Abortions, supra note 263. For an example of a fetal pain ban health 
exception, see Okla. Stat. tit. 63 § 1-745.5 (prohibiting the performance of an abortion if “the probable 
postfertilization age of the woman’s unborn child is twenty (20) or more weeks, unless, in reasonable medical 
judgment, she has a condition which so complicates her medical condition as to necessitate the abortion of her 
pregnancy to avert her death or to avert serious risk of substantial and irreversible physical impairment of a 
major bodily function, not including psychological or emotional conditions. No such condition shall be 
deemed to exist if it is based on a claim or diagnosis that the woman will engage in conduct which she intends 
to result in her death or in substantial and irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily function”). 
 265. Brief for Amici Curiae Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and Am. Cong. of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists in support of Appellants and Reversal, Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(No. 12-16670), 2012, at 13 [hereinafter ACOG Amicus]. 
 266. See, e.g., Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2013); McCormack v. Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 
2d 1128 (D. Idaho 2013); State Policies on Later Abortions, supra note 263. 
 267. State Policies on Later Abortions, supra note 263; ACOG Amicus, supra note 265, at 8–14. 
 268. ACOG Amicus, supra note 265, at 14–16. 
 269. Id. at 8. 
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advocates.
270
 The situations of women seeking an abortion at and after twenty 
weeks suggests that, when it comes to women’s health, these laws should be 
revisited to allow these abortions under a broader set of health-related 
circumstances.
271
 But fetal pain bans demonstrate something else: in addition 
to focusing on the fetus, “protecting” women’s health is used by states to 
justify reproductive health regulations when the true legislative goal is to 
restrict women’s reproductive rights.
272
 Case in point: the argument made in 
one case that later-term abortions pose greater health risks to pregnant women 
than do earlier abortions, thereby justifying the ban.
273
 These types of 
arguments are disingenuous at best.
274
 Every complication associated with 
abortion is more common in women carrying a pregnancy to term and giving 
birth: a “woman’s risk of death associated with childbirth was approximately 
14 times higher than that associated with abortion.”
275
 The State’s purported 
interest in women’s health was mobilized against women, not for them. 
While health exceptions to abortion regulations have generally been seen 
as provisions that protect women, the ritualization and desexualization present 
in a wide area of women’s reproductive health law suggest that a broader 
health exception may also lead to further government assertions of a State 
interest in “health” in non-abortion contexts. Including a mental-health based 
health exception, for example, would require a definition of “mental health” 
which could be exported to other, non-abortion law and used to truncate 
women’s rights to make their own decisions later in pregnancy or even in non-
reproductive-health contexts. Health protection may come with a price. It may 
very well be a price worth paying, but that decision should take into account the 
history of health protection and current law and politics before it is made. 
B. Abandoning the State’s Purported Interest in Reproductive Health 
When it comes to legal regulation related to women’s reproductive health, 
women are in the quintessential double-bind.
276
 Most people would agree that 
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(2013) (listing an exception for rape or incest). 
 272. McCormack v. Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1150 (D. Idaho 2013) (refusing to give credence to 
the argument that the ban was enacted to preserve women’s health and citing the title of the legislation in 
question, the “Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act”). 
 273. ACOG Amicus, supra note 265, at 14–16 (noting that abortion is “far safer than the only available 
alternative—i.e., carrying a pregnancy to term and giving birth”). 
 274. Id.; McCormack, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1150. 
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the real issue is not whether the State should take any action to protect 
women’s health. For example, few would argue that more work is not needed 
to lower maternal mortality. Pregnant women are at an especially high risk in 
the United States as compared with the rest of the developed world:
277
 
Amnesty International calls the United States’ maternal mortality rate 
“shocking.”
278
 Nonetheless, maternal fetal health funding is under attack.
279
 
The issue is not whether but how and when the State should act. 
Neither wholesale acceptance of State intervention in women’s health nor 
the wholesale rejection of State intervention in women’s bodies comes without 
a cost.
280
 Calling on the State to protect women means that laws and 
jurisprudence will contain language that allows them to do so, and, as this 
Article shows, language that “protects” women’s health can be used by the 
state to intervene in their ability to make autonomous health decisions. 
Desexualization and ritualization can both signify and propel this problem. The 
goal, then, should be to develop health regulations that are designed to 
maximize health outcomes with a minimal degree of legal interference and 
avoid the legal manufacturing of mothers through desexualization, 
ritualization, or both. 
One way for the State to improve women’s health during their 
reproductive years is to abandon desexualization and recognize that women are 
entitled to have sex for pleasure. By abandoning desexualization, the State can 
improve the availability and use of contraceptives, for example, which is only 
part of a larger legal regime that protects the ability of women to make real 
choices about whether and when to have children. Increased availability of 
contraceptives will both benefit women’s health and save the government 
money by preventing unplanned pregnancies.
281
 
 
interventionist or noninterventionist—can ever be presumptively correct without careful analysis of the power 
relationships at play in a particular regulatory context.”). 
 277. Mark Duell, America Has Worst Maternal Death Rate of Any Industrialized Nation, Claims Shocking 
Study, Mail Online (May 5, 2011), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-1383244/America-worst-
maternal-death-rate-industrialised-nation.html. 
 278. USA Urged to Confront Shocking Maternal Mortality Rate, Amnesty Int’l. (Mar. 12, 2010), 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/usa-urged-confront-shocking-maternal-mortality-rate-2010-03-
12. 
 279. News Release, Am. Congress of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Maternal and Child Health 
Advocates Decry Impact of Proposed Budget Cuts, (May 22, 2013), available at 
http://www.acog.org/About%20ACOG/News%20Room/News%20Releases/2013/Maternal%20and%20Child%2
0Health%20Advocates%20Decry%20Impact%20of%20Proposed%20Budget%20Cuts.aspx (“The American 
Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Association 
of Maternal & Child Health Programs (AMCHP), March of Dimes and the National WIC Association (NWA) 
stand in strong unified opposition to the House Appropriations Committee’s FY 2014 allocations and urge 
Congress to invest in maternal and child health programs in the next fiscal year and beyond.”). 
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Abandoning ritualization in a continuing pregnancy also holds promise 
for improving health outcomes because doing so would require abandoning 
laws that nominally, at best, protect women’s health but diminish their 
reproductive choices. In the context of abortion services, abandoning 
ritualization would require major changes in the way we view abortion, 
moving it from a shameful act of maternal avoidance to an act of reproductive 
health management. Moving away from medical rituals in abortion care and 
diversifying birth choices in continuing pregnancies may actually improve 
health outcomes by allowing women to freely make reproductive choices that 
are most suitable for their situation.
282
 
Ridding laws of desexualization and ritualization will require major 
changes in how we view women and reproduction on political, legal, medical, 
and societal levels. That will be neither easy nor immediate. Until then, by 
examining law and policy for the presence of ritualization and desexualization, 
one can determine (1) what is the true goal of a law passed; (2) the potential 
that the control over the woman exerted in the law or policy could be exported 
to or co-opted by other areas of law; and (3) whether that potential is worth the 
risk given the importance of a health-related goal. 
Conclusion 
Desire motivates consensual sex. It motivates every action related to 
pregnancy, be it to have sex, to prevent pregnancy, to bring pregnancy about, 
or to control its progress and end. There can be no child without a woman. This 
fact makes women simultaneously the most powerful and the most vulnerable 
individuals subject to State regulation. We cannot escape the fact that women 
are essentialized by society and by the law specifically: they are pushed to act 
like mothers regardless of whether they have children.
283
 
Society focuses myopically on abortion as the defining concern in 
women’s health.
284
 By looking at abortion, contraception, and birth-related 
care, we see that desexualization and ritualization underlie State attempts to 
control women’s reproductive autonomy in a variety of contexts and that 
“health” is increasingly used as a political tool instead of a medical end. 
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